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In this article, we explore the theme of sovereignty in the context of
fragmented international law. We observe that the sovereignty of States may
become relativized, not only by the political power of other States, but by its
exposure to multiple, functionally separate fields of law. We analyze this
theme by asking whether trade agreements as instruments of economic law
offer a venue for discussing the sovereignty of sub-statal entities that lack
standing on the more traditional international forums. Our analysis focuses
first on a recent decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union,
which concerned the status of Western Sahara in the framework of the EUMorocco trade agreement. We then consider the implications of that case, if
any, on the situation in the region of Abkhazia within Georgia in the context
of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement. We show how trade agreements
in some cases may (EU-Morocco), and in other cases may not (EU-Georgia),
affect the integrity of States in a novel way, depending on the intricacies of
the facts and the strictures of the terms of the applicable Agreement.
Reflecting the fragmentation of law, trade agreements thus have the potential
to grant an avenue for sub-statal entities to establish standing before a
regional court (in our case, the Court of Justice of the EU), or an
international tribunal. That, in turn, may allow these entities to reinforce
their claims for self-determination under international law. Beyond the
possible theoretical implications on the (relativity of) sovereignty, the
findings seem worth considering carefully in the context of concluding and
formulating regional and international agreements in different fields of law.
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I. INTRODUCTION1
States are the basic units of the international community. Yet, legally
speaking, what sets apart a “state” from an entity without statehood remains
a source of disagreement.2 The issue is relevant because entities other than
states do not have the same rights (and duties) as do states as members of the
international community. The current customary definition of a state derives
from the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933.3
The Convention defines statehood through the existence of a people, a
defined territory, an independent government, and the ability to enter into

1. The article has two lead authors. The co-authors would like to thank Prof. Ricardo Gosablo
Bono, Prof. Frank Hoffmeister, Dr. Luca Prete and Prof. Wouter Werner for their very useful comments.
Any errors and omissions are for the authors alone.
2. Jan Klabbers, The Right to be Taken Seriously: Self-Determination in International Law, 28
HUM. RTS. Q. 186 (2006); Cyra Akila Choudhury, From Bandung 1955 to Bangladesh 1971, in
BANDUNG, GLOBAL HISTORY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES 322
(Luis Eslava et al. eds. 2017).
3. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 3802
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
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relations with other states:4 these criteria constitute the minimum threshold
for statehood.5 In theory, recognition by third states is legally not required
for statehood. However, ultimately, the recognition of a state is at the
discretion of the already existing other states, which puts politics at the heart
of the matter.6 In practice, the actions of the other states set apart states from
recognized entities without statehood. The political acceptance explains the
divergences in the outcomes of otherwise relatively similar cases. For
example, the capacity of Kosovo to entertain its rights as a state is wider than
Palestine’s, even if the former has fewer states recognizing its statehood.7
The states that recognize Kosovo simply command greater sway in the
international order.8 Attaining the legal form of statehood has an important
legitimating function, but becoming a recognized state thus entails more in
practice than the criteria outlined in the Montevideo Convention.9
After the Second World War, most new states have come into existence
4. Id. art 1. There remains a scholarly disagreement on the amount of constitutive conditions of
statehood. While some argue that only the first three conditions outlined in the Montevideo Convention
are to be fulfilled, others see the fourth condition, namely, ‘the ability to enter into relations with other
states’ as equally constitutive. See id. Without taking a stance on this long-standing debate between the
differing theories of statehood, it appears evident that some part of effective statehood entails relations
with other states without which a state would exist solely as an internal entity.
5. MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (7th ed. 2013); JAMES R CRAWFORD,
THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 (2007).
6. See, e.g., , 87 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 18 (2017) (explaining the different standards of recognition);
HILARY CHARLESWORTH ET AL., THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 126
(2000).
7. Tamar Megiddo & Zohar Nevo, Revisiting Lessons on the New Law of Statehood: Palestinian
Independence in a Post-Kosovo World, in STATEHOOD AND SELF-DETERMINATION: RECONCILING
TRADITION AND MODERNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Duncan French ed., 2013). At present, Palestine
is recognized by 137 states, whereas Kosovo is, according to Serbia, recognised by less than one hundred
states. Agata Palickova, 15 Countries, and Counting, Revoke Recognition of Kosovo, Serbia Says,
EURACTIV (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/15-countries-andcounting-revoke-recognition-of-kosovo-serbia-says/. And according to the govenment of Kosovo, it is
recognized by 117 states. International Recognitions of the Republic of Kosovo, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFS. AND DIASPORA, https://www.mfa-ks.net/en/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-skosovs/483 (last visited Mar. 26, 2022).
8. George Kyris & Agon Demjaha, What Makes State a State? Why Places Like Kosovo Live in
Limbo?, CONVERSATION (Aug. 5, 2020, 6:56 AM) https://theconversation.com/what-makes-a-state-astate-why-places-like-kosovo-live-in-limbo-132403.
9. Even though international legal scholarship has recognized the inherent indeterminacy of legal
norms of international law, this does not implicate the insignificance of law. See generally MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT
(2006) (analyzing conflicts within international law); DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STRUCTURES (1987) (analyzing patterns in international legal doctrine and argument). On the praise of
form (and formalism) of law, see Martti Koskenniemi, What is International Law for?, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 32–57 (Malcolm D Evans ed., 3d ed. 2010).
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through the processes of decolonization or the break-up of past unitary and
federal states.10 With the new millennium, however, new claims of statehood
have appeared. These claims have usually been linked to the perceived
violations of the rights and interests of people that constitute a minority in
parts of a state. The situations in Timor Leste, South Sudan and Kosovo, for
example, have all shared this characteristic, even though in the background,
the classic grounds for invoking self-determination (decolonization, military
occupation, or a racist minority government) have also been present.
International agreements between the conflicting parties have also paved the
way for independence in these cases. These developments have led some
scholars to suggest that states earn their status through the fiat of
international authority.11
We trace a similar fiat of international authority at play in a recent case,
where the two courts of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU)—first the General Court and on appeal the Court of Justice (“the
Court”)—took decisions on the status of Western Sahara within the context
of litigation on a trade agreement between the EU and Morocco.12 The cases
seem to address the relativity of sovereignty and legal personality. If in a
Kelsenian conception the sovereignty of states becomes relativised by the
political power of the recognising states, sovereignty may nowadays have
become relativised by the fragmentation of the different functional fields of
law. Tribunals and their lawyers in one field of law (such as investment law
or trade law) may recognize an entity that a tribunal or lawyers in another
field, such as the International Criminal Court, would not, and vice versa.
Assessing statehood from the angle of international tribunals leads to
an institutional question: traditionally, recognition is given by State
governments, but not by their courts. What relevance do the pronunciations
of international tribunals thus have? Finally, the court interpretations cross
over different levels of legal systems—in our example, those of international
law and regional (European Union) law. How should conflicting
interpretations between these different courts be handled?
To explore these thoughts, we first provide a short theoretical outline of
10. The Soviet Union or Yugoslavia are examples of a dissolution of a former state into a number
of new states.
11. Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. POL’Y
373, 375 (2003); Paul R Williams & Francesca Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap
Between Sovereignty and Self-Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 347, 350 (2004).
12. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council (Front Polisario I), ECLI:EU:T:2015:953 (Dec. 10,
2015); Case C-104/16 P, Council v. Front Polisario, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973 (Feb. 19, 2016) Case T512/12, Front Polisario v. Council (Front Polisario II), ECLI:EU:T:2015:953 (Dec. 10, 2015).
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the notions of sovereignty and statehood in international legal thought in
Section 2. We then focus in Section 3 on the Moroccan case, assessing the
claims raised by Western Sahara (“Front Polisario”). We analyze whether
and how the recognition of Western Sahara as an interested party in a
litigation before the European Court of Justice could form a new avenue
where minorities can seek to claim their rights internationally. We further
investigate the wider consequences of the case on whether this legal avenue
could be understood as a manifestation of self-determination and could
thereby, ultimately, contribute to the emergence of states.
In Section 4, we test our findings of the Front Polisario case to another
situation in the territories within (or adjacent to) the neighborhood
agreements of the EU: the status of Abkhazia within the country of Georgia.
The situation in Abkhazia is admittedly different from Western Sahara: the
case for there to exist an Abkhaz people that is separate from Georgians, or
oppressed by them, seems considerably weaker. The EU is also not bound
by ius cogens to recognise Abkhazia, unlike the situation in Western Sahara.
There are nonetheless sufficient substantive similarities between the Western
Saharan and Abkhazian situations to allow for comparative insights on our
research question: whether, and under what preconditions, standing in the
CJEU under Article 263(4) TFEU could contribute to statehood under
international law. Our analysis does not advocate a normative stance on
whether this were desirable or not, nor on what the fate of the entities at the
center of our explorative cases studies—Western Sahara and Abkhazia—
should or should not be. In the final Section 5, we conclude by recapitulating
the impacts that the trade agreements may have as an international platform
for sub-statal entities to seek sovereignty.
II. SOVEREIGNTY AND STATEHOOD
A. The notions of sovereignty and statehood in international legal thought
Sovereignty is commonly defined as the authority of a community of
people, jointly or through delegation, to issue binding decisions.13 A state is
the space wherein the sovereign resides. According to Georg Jellinek, the
enmeshment of statehood and sovereignty is to secure a legal asset to the

13. Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 831 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); Land and
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 303
(Oct. 10).
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political power of the State.14 This legal asset is used to signal that those who
are a part of the sovereign body (‘us’) stand in marked distinction to those
outside it (‘others’).15 Thus, to construct a new sovereign means to construct
a new state.16
Probably the most renowned definition of statehood derives from the
Treaties of Westphalia, where the European powers agreed that the internal
affairs of a State are not to be meddled with by other powers. The Treaties
created a shelter for the exercise of domestic power—a power to
domesticate—for the sovereign within the perimeters of its own potestas and
its borders. In contrast, in its external relations, the sovereign was limited by
the powers of other sovereigns.17 Sovereignty at that time created primarily
the prerogative to go to war, and so the sovereigns also formed a natural limit
to each others’ self-interests. During the era of the absolute monarchy in
Europe, the state and the sovereign were in most regards one and the same.
This also explains the ease with which the notion of the sovereign has been
replaced by that of the state; they are closely interrelated and share a common
origin in the 17th century Europe.
The construction of “other” sovereigns in the Westphalian system was
predominantly territorial.18 For long, people were free to cross borders
without notable limitations. Subsequently, a body politic that constituted the
sovereign was bound to a territory around which fences were built and

14. Jacques Maritain, The Concept of Sovereignty, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 343 (1950) (citing 1
GEORG JELLINEK, DAS RECHT DAS MODERNEN STAATES [THE LAW OF MODERN STATES] 394 (1900)).
15. Other is anyone but us. In international law only internationally recognized sovereign powers
can function independently and entertain relations with other sovereigns; here “other” indicates another
sovereign in distinction to ‘us’. See, e.g., PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: A
CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN HOBBES, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, KANT, AND
HEGEL (1982) (analyzing contract theory and discussing the relationship between the act of willing and
consenting in self-government); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF
POLITICAL RIGHT (1762) (arguing that the government only has the right to exist and govern by the
consent of the governed); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: THE MATTER, FORM, & POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL (1651) (discussing the structure of society and legitimate
government).
16. See Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Opposition Groups as the Legitimate Representative of a
People, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 219, 246–47 (2013) (describing the question of who is the “sole
representative of the people” as a question of consequence).
17. For a critical account on the legacy of the Westphalian system, see, for example, Andreas
Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55 INT’L ORG. 251 (2001).
18. See generally Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions:
Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. POL. 513
(2001) (discussing the relationship between the transformation of colonial territories into sovereign states
and the League of Nations).
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borders were drawn on the map.19 To gain recognition for the existence of
these fences, and hence of the state, the sovereign relied on other, already
recognized sovereigns.20 Yet, this process was anything but simple. Initially,
a sovereign had to indicate its civilized manners in the eyes of chiefly
European states. An international polity shaped by European powers acted
as a benchmark for new states through a highly subjective ‘standard of
civilization.’ This had a direct bearing on the validity of sovereignty: under
international law, even though a sovereign might hold supreme power
internally, a subjugation of the sovereign to other sovereigns in its external
relationships suggested that it was, in fact, not properly a sovereign unless
and until so acknowledged by the others. For example, a king in Africa could
have been able to command internal matters in the territory, but his claims
for the recognition of sovereignty would be categorically denied.21
Consequently, European states considered these territories terra nullius
under international law.22
A reason for not recognizing the sovereignty of political communities
outside of Europe was that these communities were not considered to be
bound by the same moral code as the European states. Hence, they could not
enter the family of states, either. If a sovereign was not considered one
concomitant to the Western civilizational standard, it could not emerge as a
state.23 Without a state, no territory that would belong to anyone existed,
irrespective of the presence of even a sophisticated and long-lasting political
organization.24 This thinking characterized the colonial era and allowed the
19. See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS
PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM (2006) (describing the Sovereign as a fence builder).
20. See generally Brett Bowden, In the Name of Progress and Peace: The “Standard of
Civilization” and the Universalizing Project, 29 ALTS.: GLOB., LOC. & POL. 43 (2004).
21. See, e.g., BONNY IBHAWOH, IMPERIAL JUSTICE: AFRICANS IN EMPIRE’S COURT (2013)
(analyzing the contradictory goals of the colonial British justice system in recognizing the exceptionality
of native people and their cultures, while trying to keep the justice system in conformity with British
standards).
22. The literal translation of the Latin term terra nullius means “nobody’s land.” On the use of the
term in law, see, for example Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law:
Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 25 (2005); Malcolm Shaw, The Western
Sahara Case, 49 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 119 (1979).
23. See generally GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF “CIVILIZATION” IN INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY (1984) (discussing the history of the Eurocentric “standard of civilization” that has come under
increasing scrutiny over time); GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES (Cambridge ed.
2004) (describing how the international legal order, based on the idea sovereign equality, has
accommodated the Great Powers and regulated outlaw states).
24. See generally ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE 1500-2000
(2014) (analyzing the laws that shaped modern European empires and the evolution of arguments
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European conquests around the world.25
Since the Treaties of Westphalia, the notion of statehood has undergone
an important development. Before the creation of the United Nations
(“UN”), statehood was chiefly a question of the Western countries’ capacity
to hold onto their occupations the world over. The number of states globally
before the First World War was a few dozen and before the Second World
War had only increased by a few states. Most of them were still to be found
in Europe, and only two were situated in Africa (Abyssinia and Liberia).26
While a tight territorial nexus between the sovereign and the state has
subsisted until the present,27 the requirement of a ‘civilization’ as an element
of statehood was abandoned. The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States (1933) became the point of reference; it is considered to
codify the requirements for statehood as established under customary
international law.28
According to the Montevideo Convention, a state forms the nexus
between a defined territory, a self-governing people, and a government
capable of entertaining relations with other states. The introduction of formal
criteria for statehood reduced the significance of the political will of the
already existing states: recognition by other states became less important.29
surrounding the right to occupy foreign lands).
25. The importance of shared civilization was later justified through arguments that international
law was not law properly, due to its lack of superior authority to impose sanctions on states. Since nonwestern States did not share the civilization of the European states, the common moral consensus that
established norms of international law could not extend to them and vice versa. Therefore, much of the
world was no-man’s-land (terra nullius) for international law before European colonies emerged.
26. These African states, however, remained subject to limitation of their rights vis-à-vis their
European counterparts. See, e.g., ROSE PARFITT, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REPRODUCTION: INEQUALITY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, RESISTANCE (Cambridge Stud. Int’l & Comp. L. Ser.
137, 2019).
27. See generally Abhimanyu George Jain, The 21st century Atlantis: The International Law of
Statehood and Climate Change-Induced Loss of Territory, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014) (discussing the
importance of territory to sovereignty and the debate over states without territory due to rising sea levels);
Derek Wong, Sovereignty Sunk-The Position of Sinking States at International Law, 14 MELB. J. INT’L
L. 346 (2013) (same).
28. Montevideo Convention, supra note 3.
29. According to the dominant declaratory theory of recognition, states emerge first, and the
recognition of the international community serves as a mere declaration of an already existing legal fact.
This view is in contradiction with the constitutive theory of recognition. See generally Stefan Oeter, The
Kosovo Case—An Unfortunate Precedent, 75 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES R. UND
VÖLKERR. [ZAÖRV] [J. FOREIGN PUB. L. & INT’L L.] 51 (2015) (arguing that the recognition of Kosovo
as an independent state sets a dangerous precedent of legitimizing premature self-declared secessionist
movements that could threaten the peace and stability of the international order); Jure Vidmar, Explaining
the Legal Effects of Recognition, INT’L COMP. L. Q. 361 (2012); Stefan Talmon, The Constitutive Versus
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This also diluted the hierarchy that the past constitutive effect of recognition
had functionally created between states and those still seeking such a status.30
Although the Montevideo Convention is widely recognized as
customary international law, it has not created a self-standing right for every
self-governed people that is connected to a territory to be recognized as a
state.31 In other words, the Montevideo Convention did not create a right to
self-determination that would have granted all self-governed people an equal
opportunity to become a state.
Self-determination, as introduced in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 based
on the ideas of the British premier, David Lloyd George,32 and especially the
US President, Woodrow Wilson,33 was taken up as a principle in Article 1(2)
of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. The UN General Assembly
(“UNGA”) subsequently interpreted the concept as customary international
law.34 Self-determination expressed the commitment to respect every
people’s free will.35 It declared that even the formerly rightless people in the
colonies will have the right, in principle, to define their future political fate.36
The UN transformed the hierarchical order between Europe and most other
states into a flatter system, highlighting the formal equality between all states
and peoples.
Despite the flatness, in theory, of the new order of states and the
existence of formal standards, there remained in practice constraints that
prevented new states from emerging. The most notable of these was the
the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?, 75 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 101 (2005).
30. Obviously, there were also other hierarchical relations between political entities during the preUnited Nations era from colonies to vassal states.
31. Cedric Ryngaert & Sven Sobrie, Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The
Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 467,
470 (2011).
32. David Lloyd George, U.K. Prime Minister, Address at the Trade Union Conference (Jan. 5,
1918).
33. Woodrow Wilson, U.S. President, Fourteen Points Speech to the United States Congress (Jan.
8, 1918).
34. See G.A. Res. 1883 (III), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, pmbl.
(Oct. 24, 1970) (“Convinced that the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary international law . . . .”) [hereinafter Friendly
Relations Declaration].
35. While the origin of the principle of the self-determination of the colonial people seems
noncontroversial, the matter is hardly settled as exemplified by the Request of the Advisory Opinion from
the ICJ on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965,
Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. Rep. 169 (Feb. 25).
36. See Friendly Relations Declaration supra note 34.
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principle of territorial integrity. It forms a force that is often diametrically
opposed to the principle of self-determination. As Rigo Sureda has argued,
at that time, self-determination was seen as secondary to territorial
integrity.37 Decolonization has, however, constituted a process that has
challenged the order of precedence:
“State practice does not support the conclusion that the people of a
disputed territory have a right to self-determination . . . unless they are
colonial peoples, and even then colonial territories to which pending
territorial claims exist have their right of self-determination limited
precisely by the existence of such claims.”38

Even though a colonial territory could have been inhabited by multiple
people, only one claim of self-determination can currently emerge from it.
The people, and hence the states, became in many parts of the world defined
on the basis of the territories that follow the administrative borders drawn by
European empires. The former colonizers granted independence to their
colonies following the borders they themselves had drawn (uti possidetis
principle).39
B. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara
The international legal debate on the newly emerged self-governed
peoples and their attribution to specific territories came to the limelight in
the International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”) Advisory Opinion on Western
Sahara.40 The territory of Western Sahara had been a colony for a long time.
Spain’s colonial rule over it dissipated in the mid-1900s, actualizing the issue

37. A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: A STUDY OF
UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 215 (1973); see also G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on Granting
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960); G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Principles Which
Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information
Called for Under Article 73 e of The Charter (Dec. 14, 1960); Tom Brower, Reframing Kurtz’s Painting:
Colonial Legacies and Minority Rights in Ethnically Divided Societies, 27 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 35
(2016).
38. SUREDA, supra note 37, at 215.
39. See generally Malcolm N. Shaw, The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris
Today, 67 BRIT. Y.B.. INT’L L. 75 (1997); Shaw, supra note 22 (discussing self-determination, territorial
integrity, and national unity in the context of the Western Sahara case); Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples,
Territorialism and Boundaries, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 478 (1997); Ratner R. Steven, Drawing a Better Line:
UTI Possidetis and the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 590 (1996); Gino J. Naldi, The Case
Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali): Uti Possidetis in an African
Perspective, 36 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 893 (1987).
40. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
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of to whom the territory would belong.41 The UNGA sought clarity in the
case by posing a two-part question to the ICJ. The UNGA first asked whether
the territory of Western Sahara belonged to no-one during the colonization,
i.e. whether it constituted a terra nullius.42 To this, the ICJ answered in the
negative, maintaining that at the time of Spanish colonization “Western
Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and
politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent
them.”43 Western Sahara was thus not terra nullius.44 This led the ICJ to
answer the second question of the General Assembly, namely, whether the
Kingdom of Morocco or the “Mauritanian entity” had legal ties with Western
Sahara during this time period.45 This time, the Court answered in the
affirmative, even if with some fluidity, on both accounts. There had existed
‘legal ties’ between Western Sahara, on the one hand, and the Kingdom of
Morocco and the Mauritanian entity, on the other.46 They did however not
constitute ties of territorial sovereignty between the aforementioned
entities.47 In the absence of such ties, the Sahrawi people had a right to selfdetermination once the Spanish colonization of their territory ended.48
From the period of the standard of civilization to that of decolonization,
little has happened to the powers attached to statehood itself, despite the
multiplication in the number of states. A genuine lack of a right to establish
a state, even within the framework of decolonization, partly fueled the
evolution that led to the present status of sovereignty in international law.49
Sovereignty in international law is constituted of the interlinked notions of
internal and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to the
legitimate and ultimate rule over the territory of a state, whereas external
sovereignty denotes the idea of the sovereign’s autonomy from external
interference by other states. Thus, any interference over the states’ internal
and external sovereignty is a violation of its absolute sovereignty. However,
international law identifies many instances when an international authority50
41. Id. ¶¶ 1, 79, 82.
42. G.A. Res. 3292 (XXIX), ¶ 1 (Dec. 13, 1974); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶ 1.
43. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶ 81.
44. Id.
45. Id. ¶ 1.
46. Id. ¶ 162.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶¶ 161–162.
49. Scharf, supra note 11, at 377.
50. International authority is perceived here as a nebulous development of international
organizations and their mission that has mutated to a form where it appears an impartial umpire while
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has interfered with states’ internal sovereignty. For example, the executive
rule of the United Nations was extended already during the early years to
offer a justification for interferences. The UN peacekeeping missions in Suez
and Congo are the first manifestations of this practice.51
C. Earned sovereignty and remedial secession
The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara addressed precisely the
role of an international authority in endowing sovereignty.52 The Advisory
Opinion suggested that the presence of ‘certain circumstances’ would be
sufficient grounds for an international authority to impose statehood as a fact,
even without asking the people.53 Such special circumstances could perhaps
include the gravest injustices perpetrated by the sovereign against the people.
The thesis for this type of “earned sovereignty” or “remedial secession”
would suggest that statehood should not be perceived (only) as a fulfillment
of people’s will, but also – and in some special cases even, rather – as a
remedy for the experienced injustices.54
What, then, is the role of an international authority in addressing these
injustices? In most instances, evidence of a sovereign ruler subjecting a part
of its people to violence leads to the issue being brought up in an
international institution or organ. The international authority then intervenes
directly in the atrocities committed by a sovereign. Thus, the “special
circumstances” signal a sovereign’s failure to uphold its responsibility
towards its people. This type of a process of remedial secession seems to
have been legally and politically conducive to the emergence of a new state
in a handful of cases. The seceding entity is of course not always the victim;
it can also be the aggressor.
Sovereignty that is earned through a remedial secession relates closely
to new forms of state responsibility that reflects the mainstreaming of human
serving ends closely aligned with, often, Euro-American ideology. See generally Anne Orford, Locating
the International: Military and Monetary Interventions after the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443,
452–55 (1997) (discussing the austerity program that the former Yugoslavia was put on by the IMF).
51. Guy Fiti Sinclair, Towards a Postcolonial Genealogy of International Organizations Law, 31
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 858, 860 (2018).
52. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶ 1.
53. The ICJ Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara recognizes in certain circumstances tracing the
will of people is unnecessary. Klabbers, supra note 2, at 194–95; Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶ 59.
54. See generally Michel Seymour, Remedial Secession, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF STATE
RECOGNITION (Gëzim Visoka et al. eds., 2020) (arguing that nations do not have a primary unilateral
right to secede, but that they could if there were a special right to do so).
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rights. The situations are monitored by a “faceless international authority,”
created by successive generations of international officials in various
international organizations in the name of humanity or other global calling.55
Earned sovereignty and the new forms of state responsibility are
administered from the outside, to protect the supposedly best interests of the
people concerned.56 The emergence of newly formed states such as Kosovo,
Timor Leste, and South Sudan bear characteristics of such a remedial
secession, as their creation responded to the atrocities perpetrated by the
sovereigns that ruled the territories.
In recent scholarship and international practice, the ‘special
circumstances’ indicated in the Advisory Opinion have come to stand for the
triple standard of democracy, rule of law and human rights.57 The
international authority can now assess and control a suspect sovereign
against the triple standard. A failure to meet the standard can – sometimes
still depending on the political power of those recognizing the entity—lead
to the emergence of new states within the boundaries of an already existing
state. It can also result in lesser intrusions or reformulations of an existing
state, as in the cases of Mali or Iraq.58 If a state has emerged from the failure
of a sovereign to act responsibly towards its people, the emerged state may
not be absolutely sovereign from the outset. It is usually subjected to specific
conditions and continues to be monitored by the international authority. Even
though these sovereigns satisfy the formal criteria of statehood, they remain
suspect cases for the international authority.59
The establishment of sovereignty through democracy, rule of law, and
55. G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Sept. 16, 2005). On such novel forms of
responsibility in the international plane, see generally Outi Korhonen & Toni Selk. . .l. . ., Theorizing
Responsibility, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anne Orford & Florian
Hoffmann eds., 2016) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK]; Sinclair supra note 51, at 841–69; Guy Fiti
Sinclair, A ‘Civilizing Task’: The International Labour Organization, Social Reform, and the Genealogy
of Development, 20 J. HIST. INT’L L. REV. 145, 191–93 (2018) [hereinafter Sinclair, Civilizing Task].
56. See generally Anne Orford, Protection in the Shadow of Empire, in INTERNATIONAL
AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1 (2011) (discussing the practices of international
actors aimed at maintaining order and protecting life in the decolonized world).
57. See Gerry J. Simpson, Something to Do with States, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at
564–82; Rose Parfitt, Theorizing Recognition and International Personality, in OXFORD HANDBOOK,
supra note 55, at 591–92. See generally Frank Hoffmeister, The Contribution of EU Practice to
International Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 37 (Marise Cremona ed.,
2008).
58. See, e.g., Matilda Arvidsson, The Subject in International Law: The Administrator of the
Coalition Provisional Authority of Occupied Iraq and its Laws (2016) (dissertation, Lund University).
59. Parfitt, supra note 57, at 583; ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (John Bell et al. eds., 2007).
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human rights comes into question solely when the international authority
observes a grave violation of these standards. Many states ask for assistance
from the international authorities to guide their democratic and economic
reforms and to build a law-abiding society.60 Usually, the interference of the
international authority on the sovereignty amounts only to assistance to
strengthen the state institutions and to undertake economic reforms.61 In the
past, these reforms were often aimed at creating a free market economy,
fostering foreign investments, and opening the markets to a free flow of
capital.62 However, this developmental agenda resulted in instances of
unsustainable levels of debt. 63 When states defaulted on their loans or had to
seek the restructuring of their debts, they needed to do so in accordance with
the demands and requirements of the globalized monetary and financial
systems granting the loans. This effectively meant that the countries had to
partly delegate their internal sovereignty to the international (financial)
institutions.64
D. Economic sovereignty
Economic independence has long been considered a cornerstone of
sovereignty. It has been fairly uncontested in international law from the times
of Jean Bodin to Serbian Loans.65 Bodin in his Six Books of the
60. Simpson, supra note 57, at 564–82. See generally GUY FITI SINCLAIR, TO REFORM THE WORLDINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN STATES (Oxford University Press
2017) (analyzing the expanding role of international organizations in military, financial, economic,
political, social, and cultural affairs).
61. Katharina Pistor, From Territorial to Monetary Sovereignty, 18 THEOR. INQUIRIES L. 491
(2017).
62. See generally David Williams, Liberalism, Colonialism and Liberal Imperialism, 45 E. CENT.
EUR. 94 (2018) (discussing the discourses and practices of some modern forms of liberal imperialism
stemming from post-Cold War, expansionist and interventionist policies and practices by western states);
Hans Mahncke, Sovereignty and Developing Countries: Current Status and Future Prospects at the WTO,
22 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 395 (2009) (discussing concerns about globalization and the increasingly complex
regulatory setting for developing countries); David Williams, Aid and Sovereignty: Quasi-States and the
International Financial Institutions, 26 REV. INT’L. STU. 557 (2000) (examining the changing status of
sovereignty for some of the world’s poorest countries). On the challenges of regulating Transnational
Corporations (TNCs) in developing countries more broadly, see Harri Kalimo & Tim Staal, “Softness”
in International Instruments: The Case of Transnational Corporations, 42 SYRAC. J. INT’L L. & COM.
365 (2015).
63. Pistor, supra note 61, at 502.
64. Id.
65. See generally Claus D. Zimmerman, The Concept of Monetary Sovereignty Revisted, 24 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 797 (2013) (examining whether the concept of monetary sovereignty is subject to evolution
under the impact of globalization and financial integration).
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Commonwealth referred to the power of the monarch to coin money and to
have an absolute control on its allocation and value.66 In Serbian Loans, the
Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) found that “[i]t is indeed
a generally accepted principle that a State is entitled to regulate its own
currency.”67 By the 1970s, monetary sovereignty in this traditional sense had
largely eroded. The development was a consequence of the end of the
Bretton Woods monetary system, marked by the unilateral decision of the
United States to leave behind the gold standard and allow its currency to
float. This created global capital markets that replaced the former bilateral
loan agreements with privately funded state bonds.68 In this way, the private
financial institutions, facilitated by the interventions of states and the
international authority, captured parts of what used to be (economic)
sovereignty.
The power of the economy to discipline sovereignty is largely aligned
with the tenets of modern mainstream economic thought. State finances need
to be managed with discipline, with demand for austerity in cases of
overspending. This is considered by some to reflect a neoliberal economic
policy and be a part of economic globalization.69 Like the international
authority of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
and the World Bank have also been depicted as international actors, wielding
impartial economic expertise as their foremost tool.70 Such international
authorities are distinct from, and more anonymous than, the traditional
sovereigns. The economy is omnipresent and not represented by any
particular entity; its dictates are equally as much a part of the sovereign as
an element for its control. Unlike many other constraints on sovereignty, the
global economy is part of both the self and the others.
The conceptualization of sovereignty has thus gone through extensive
changes in the UN era. While the UN Charter speaks of the formal equality
of sovereigns, this formally flat system has transformed into one where some
sovereigns are more dependent than others on the support of international
66. JEAN BODIN & M. J. TOOLEY, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 56 (1955).
67. Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Yugo.), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 20, at 96 (July 12); CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 500–01 (6th ed.
2005).
68. Pistor, supra note 61, at 500–01.
69. See generally, e.g., CORNEL BAN, RULING DEAS: HOW GLOBAL NEOLIBERALISM GOES LOCAL
(2016) (explaining why neoliberal hybrids take on their forms and how they survive crises).
70. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 273
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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authorities. The international authority has often been called for—and
occasionally imposed—its assistance on sovereigns that are considered
incapable of governing.71 As such, the presumed flatness of sovereignty in
fact admits de facto differences in the sovereign capacity of the states.
Gradually, the state supporting functions may have become state shaping
functions. The ethos upon which the international authority has shaped the
states has markedly been that of economic liberalism. The heterarchical
system has justified the international authorities’ economic interference.72
Unlike the formal equality of states, the economic system thus has elements
of hierarchy. In this sense, sovereignty has gone full circle: from a handful
of sovereigns during the colonial era to the proliferation of formally equal
sovereigns as enshrined in the UN Charter to, finally, a set of sovereigns
whose powers are limited in terms of de facto economic independence.
The globalization of the economy has created extensive networks of
commerce between companies located in virtually all States. As a result,
economic disputes also occur globally. To resolve disputes arising between
the economic actors, various kinds of courts and tribunals have been set up
in the global economy.73 In addition to the prominent interstate dispute
settlement of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), free trade agreements
(“FTAs”) and bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), which contain
provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”), have steadily
grown in number and importance. Thus, economic actors may increasingly
have choices on which way to settle their disputes.
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka74 is an example of these
types of arbitration cases. It concerned the Sri Lanka-UK BIT. In this case,
the members of the ICSID Tribunal made a 2-1 decision that Sri Lanka had
failed to meet the due diligence standard when engaging in counterinsurrection activities in the country.75 As is established under customary
international law, the Sri Lankan government was to take all measures that
71. Orford, supra note 56, at 2.
72. SINCLAIR, supra note 60, at 120–21.
73. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS,
POLITICS, RIGHTS (2014) (discussing the development and trends in the creation and role of international
courts); Tarald Laudal Berge & Helge Hveem, The International Regime for Investment: A History of
Failed Multilateralism, in HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
CORPORATION 311 (Andreas Nölke & Christian May eds., 2018) (discussing why there is no multilateral
agreement on investment and whether one is needed).
74. Asian Agric. Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final
Award (June 27, 1990), 6 ICSID Rev. 526 (1991).
75. Id. ¶¶ 40, 85.
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could be reasonably expected to prevent its actions from leading to losses of
human life and property.76 It had failed to do so when targeting its use of
force on the production facilities of an unrelated third-party foreign
investor.77 The BIT that protected the economic interests of investors thus
limited, or at least affected, the sovereign’s use of military power against
insurgents. Agreements like the Sri Lanka-UK BIT may therefore set limits
on the scope of a sovereign’s internal sovereignty.78
While these clauses address the internal aspect of a State’s sovereignty
(i.e., the use of police powers and compensation for ensuing damages to third
parties), they may also effectively curtail the State’s external sovereignty:
when taking measures that are required to effectively control its territory, the
State will need to consider the financial consequences of the measures on
other States.79 Hence, the bilateral and multilateral treaties that lead to
arbitration affect both the State’s external and internal sovereignty. They
may even go as far as questioning the (State’s) right to conclude a treaty in
the first place, as was the case in Front Polisario. These treaties also regulate
investments in third countries, and therefore need to be carefully evaluated
for their impacts on other internal policies and politics, as the controversies
surrounding EU’s (currently suspended) negotiations on the TTIP agreement
with the US demonstrated. In many ways, the interests of the economy have
become a powerful force which states need to acknowledge in various ways.
In the aftermath of the Front Polisario decision, there have been a number
of claims by different actors linked to the case of Western Sahara that have
sought to challenge both private and public interests that derived their
authorization from the Moroccan government. These developments may
have fundamentally changed perceptions of the status of economic relations
and agreements in international law.80
76. Id. ¶¶ 85, 86.
77. Id. ¶ 85.
78. See generally Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, When the Claim Hits: Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning, 65 WORLD POLIT. 273 (2013) (showing that
developing countries often ignored the risks of bilateral investment treaties until they became subject to
an investment treaty claim).
79. See generally DIETER GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF A POLITICAL AND
LEGAL CONCEPT (2015) (discussing whether recent political changes have undermined notions of
national sovereignty and comparing manifestations of the concept in different parts of the world); MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 18901960 386 (2002) (studying the rise and fall of modern international law, agruing inteernational law was
meant to “civilize” late nineteenth-century attitudes towards race and society).
80. See Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a Council Decision
on the Conclusion of an Agreement in the Form of an Exchange of Letters Between the European Union
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Various international legal scholars have lamented trade disputes and
fragmentation as signs of growing compartmentalization and technical
management of international law.81 Yet, through cases like Front Polisario,
it is perhaps also possible to argue the reverse: the governance structures of
the economy may, through fragmentation, serve some of the traditional
interests of public international law by providing a forum for those that wish
to be self-governed. Through the new venues and powers of economic
interests, people’s self-determination and equality, outlined in the United
Nations system, may have found new ways to materialize. In the past, states
may have accepted the jurisdiction of an international court, whereas now,
in the interconnected world of trade, they are also bound by the dispute
settlement mechanisms of the trade agreements that they are parties to.82
States cannot foresee all the repercussions flowing from the BITs and FTAs
because the range of the matters related to foreign investment and trade is so
vast.83 As a consequence, an apparently rational actor such as a state may not
comprehend all the rules of an agreement that may bind it in unexpected
ways in the future.
But like most fragments of law, the economic law cuts both ways. A
growing body of scholarship on international law and development outlines
the role of the economy in the wider developmental project of international
law.84 The presumed universality of economic development and economic
indicators has rendered the economic policies and models of the developed

and the Kingdom of Morocco on Amending Protocols 1 And 4 of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement
Establishing an Association Between the European Communities and their Member States, of the One
Part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the Other Part, COM (2018) 481 final (June 11, 2018).
81. See, e.g., Int’l L. Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006); Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Technique and Politics,
70 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2007) (criticizing the technical specialization of international law into functional
regimes).
82. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54
INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (discussing the the different types of and reasons for the “widespread legalization
of international governance”, such as dispute settelement mechanisms in trade agreements); Poulsen &
Aisbett, supra note 78, at 17–18.
83. Poulsen and Aisbett, supra note 78, at 11.
84. See, e.g., ANGHIE, supra note 59 (arguing that colonization was central to the formation of
international law and the idea of sovereignty); Orford, supra note 56 (discussing the practices of
international actors aimed at maintaining order and protecting life in the decolonized world); SUNDHYA
PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS
OF UNIVERSALITY (2011); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW:
DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) (critiquing twentiethcentury international law from the perspective of Third World social movements).

KALIMO READY FOR ADOBE(DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ERA OF FRAGMENTATION

12/19/2022 10:10 PM

371

world as the benchmarks that ought to be adopted by the less developed
nations of the world. This linkage of development and economy has worked
in favor of both the developed and developing countries and their economies:
the share of the world population living in extreme poverty has decreased
from approximately 55 percent in 1960 to less than 10 percent in 2015.85
There are also, however, claims that through their influence in the
international financial institutions, developed countries have promoted the
policies of free trade and investments in developing countries in a manner
that has constrained the opportunities of developing nations, and been more
detrimental – or at least less beneficial – to them than could and should have
been the case.86
The ever-growing network of trade and investment treaties locks the
States together and may lead to contractual obligations that may be triggered
in unpredictable ways in arbitration tribunals. For example, the Yukos
Universal Limited v. The Russian Federation87 case under the Energy
Charter Treaty led to unforeseen consequences due to a seemingly innocuous
treaty commitment. The dispute on the matter concerned the declared
bankruptcy of Yukos that followed from Russian tax authorities’ decisions
in 2000-2003 concerning the taxes and fines imposed on the company.88
Shareholders of Yukos initiated a number of legal processes in diverse
venues in an attempt to regain the property lost due to the actions of the
Russian Federation.89 While the European Court of Human Rights
constituted a relatively traditional international forum, the jurisdiction of
which was foreseeable,90 the Energy Treaty Charter offered a rather special
85. Max Roser & Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Global Extreme Poverty, OUR WORLD IN DATA,
https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
86. ANGHIE, supra note 59 at 5.; Margot E Salomon, From NIEO to Now and the Unfishable Story
of Economic Justice, 62 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 31 (2013) (discussing why international law has failed the
global poor and what interests it served instead); Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, Rep. of the Independent
Experts on the Effects of Foreign Debt and Other Related International Financial Obligations of States
on the Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights, Particularly Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.
Doc. A/74/178 (2019).
87. Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Fed’n, P.C.A Case No. AA227 (July 18, 2014).
88. Id. ¶ 63.
89. See id. ¶¶ 8–62 (providing a summary of the winding history of the case together with access to
all decisions thereof).
90. See Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russ., App. No. 14902/04 (July 31, 2014)
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145730. The compensations set out in decision remain to this date
unpaid due a decision by the of the Russian Constitutional Court declaring the decision by the European
Court of Human Rights unconstitutional. Postanovlenie Konstitucionnogo Suda Rossijskoj Federacii ot
19 janvar’ 2017 [Ruling of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of Jan. 19, 2017, SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF
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venue for arbitration, where there was no formal agreement on the part of the
Russian Federation to allow the arbitration to take place. This precise
concern was voiced by Russia after the Permanent Court of Arbitration had
passed its judgment, and it led in 2016 to the Hague District Court setting
aside the awards due to the lacking jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.91 The
Court of Appeals of the Hague, however, overturned the District Court’s
decision in a landmark decision.92 The case indicates how investors’ interests
intersect with the sovereign’s exercise of power.
A consequence of fragmentation, caused by the hundreds of trade and
investment Treaties aimed at facilitating the functioning of the international
economy, might thus also be the contestation of sovereignty and statehood.
States enter into multiple treaties, which create a normative network. Once
introduced to the network, it is difficult for the States to limit the network’s
normative application in settling disputes. The norms may allow parties to
challenge a State’s (interpretation of its) internal sovereignty. Whereas only
a few States would go so far as to consider initiating interstate proceedings
to protect the investments of their nationals, the private parties holding direct
economic interests are not constrained in the same way.93
III. WESTERN SAHARA
In parallel with the fact that private parties have only limited constraints
in defending their interests, the globalization of trade has extended the means
of doing so—the networks of trade and investment treaties—to even the most
distant of places. Western Sahara sits in arid northwestern Africa,
surrounded by Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the Atlantic Ocean.
Products emanating from this territory are a part of the trade flows to the
European Union and, thus, some claim, fall within the scope of international
economic law in the form of the EU-Morocco Trade Agreement.94

LEGISLATION] 2017, No. 5, Art. 866 (Russ.).
91. Case C/09/477160, Russian Fed’n v. Veteran Petroleum Ltd., ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2020:234
(Apr. 20, 2016).
92. Case 200.197.079/01, Judgment of the Court of Appeal of The Hague [Gerechtshof Den Haag],
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2020:234 (Feb. 18, 2020).
93. There are, of course, classic international law cases where States have done so. See, e.g.,
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 4 (Feb.
5).
94. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953 (Dec. 10, 2015); Case C-104/16 P,
Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973 (Feb. 19, 2016).
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A. The political history of Western Sahara
Western Sahara has a long, contested political history from at least the
11 century to the present. The territory of today’s Western Sahara is an
outcome of treaties concluded between France and Spain.95 The question of
to whom it belongs since decolonization has been a matter of heated debate.
This is partly due to the fact that the people living in the area have
traditionally consisted of nomadic tribes who have shown allegiance to a
wide range of rulers.96 The present and historical relationships of
dependence, especially with neighboring Morocco and Mauritania, are
foundational to the long-lasting crisis in Western Sahara.97
Before exploring in more detail, the Front Polisario case, a short
excursus through three snapshots—colonial, decolonized, and present—on
the history of the crisis in Western Sahara is in order. The borders of Western
Sahara were outlined during the Berlin Conference of 1884–8598 and
enforced in bilateral treaties by the Great Powers.99 The borders paid little
attention to any existing political structures; “[t]heir arbitrariness divid[ed]
people and in other ways result[ed] in absurd situations.”100 Besides the
absurdity, the borders often connected vast areas under the centralized
regional rule, with feuding groups unified under a possibly hostile central
th

95. Sidi M. Omar, The Right to Self-Determination and the Indigenous People of Western Sahara,
21 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF’S 41, 43 (2008).
96. Id. at 43–44; Pedro Pinto Leite, International Legality Versus Realpolitik: The Cases of Western
Sahara and East Timor, in THE WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN
DECOLONIZATION 11, 12 (Claes Olsson ed., 2006).
97. Gregory White, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 54 AFR. STUD.
REV. 194, 194–95 (2011). See generally H.T. Norris, The Wind of Change in the Western Sahara, 130
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 1 (1964) (discussing the history of the Western Sahara); Pablo San Martin,
Nationalism, Identity and Citizenship in the Western Sahara, 10 J.N. AFR. STUD. 565 (2007) (analyzing
the development of a national identity in response to the hegemonic policies of the Polisario and Morocco
to better understand the Western Sahara conflict).
98. The Berlin Conference legitimized the conquest of the coastal regions, based upon which Spain
launched its conquest of Western Sahara in 1884. At the same time, it was the concluding agreement with
France that was finally agreed upon in 1900, but was never signed, that demarcated the area. As such,
while there is no mention of Western Sahara in the Berlin Conference, without the Conference, Spain
would not have launched its conquest of Western Sahara. General Act of the Berlin Conference on West
Africa, Feb. 26 1885. Omar, supra note 95, at 45.
99. EDWARD HERTSLET, RICHARD WILLIAM BRANT & HARRY LESLIE SHERWOOD, THE MAP OF
AFRICA BY TREATY 1165 (1909) (“Convention between France and Spain for the delimitation of their
possessions in Western Africa, signed at Paris, 27th June 1900.”).
100. Ieuan Griffiths, The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries, 152 GEOGRAPHICAL
J. 204, 204, 209 (1986).
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rule. From the late 19th century until the beginning of the Second World War,
Spain commanded the area of Western Sahara. From 1939 onwards, the
territory of Western Sahara was governed by Spanish Morocco.101 The area
itself was hardly the most prosperous of colonies, but fisheries together with
mines of iron ore formed the core of the Spanish colonial economy in the
area. In the post-war era, Spain was relatively slow to dismantle its dominion
in Africa.102 This, however, did not prevent claims for the area of Western
Sahara from being raised by the protectorate, Morocco.103 Since the 1950s,
long before the formal end of the Spanish presence in 1975, a series of claims
were raised by Morocco and partly enforced through a military presence.
During the colonial era, many of the key questions raised in Front
Polisario were already present. The first concerned the prevalence of
fisheries and fishing rights as the main source of income. The importance of
fisheries for coastal states has made fisheries prominent in international law
for a long time. Limitations to the rights of other states to conduct
commercial fishing in exclusive economic zones have been a staple of the
modern law of the seas.104 Second, a defining feature of the governance of
Western Sahara has been the changing of rulers who have established their
dominion on either historical claims or military and economic might.
Allegiances remained important and territorial claims were made by the
rulers with limited concern for the people living in the area.
A snapshot of a decolonized Western Sahara resembles to a great extent
that of the colonized Western Sahara. The UN105 provided rights to the
Sahrawi people living in the area of Western Sahara, yet nevertheless failed
to convey a meaningful articulation of these rights. The calls for the people’s
right to self-determination, a referendum,106 or listing Western Sahara as a
non-self-governing area did little to give power to the Sahrawi people. The
rights of newly decolonized people remained, to a great extent, tightly
connected to the “arbitrary and absurd” colonial borders—a fact reflected in

101. Spanish Morocco was established in November 27, 1912 by the treaty between France and
Spain. Omar, supra note 95, at 43–44; see generally Paula Maria Vernet, Decolonization: Spanish
Territories, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 1124–36 (2017).
102. Vernet, supra note 101; Isidoros, supra note 96, at 173.
103. Morocco was a protectorate under French and Spanish rule since the 1912 agreements with
France and Spain.
104. See generally Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Norway), Judgement, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116 (Dec. 18)
(adjudicating the validity of a decree delimiting Norwegian fisheries zone).
105. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 37; G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 37.
106. S.C. Res. 1429 (July 30, 2002).
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the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on Western Sahara.107 To clarify the
situation, the UNGA decided to subject the issue to the ICJ. The UNGA’s
asked, as noted,108 whether the area of Western Sahara is a no man’s land –
a terra nullius – or whether it belonged to Morocco or Mauritania. The
UNGA’s questions did not reflect the option that the area should in fact
belong to the people who had lived there for very long – the Sahrawi.109
The move from the colonial era to decolonization changed relatively
little in terms of the factual circumstances of Western Sahara. Moving from
a single ruler (i.e. Spain) first to tripartite governance (i.e. Spain, Morocco,
and Mauritania)110 and back to one ruler (i.e. Morocco)111 did not alter the
status of Western Sahara.112 Even though there were few changes in terms of
the factual situation, legally the changes were relevant.113
In the 20th century, the recognition of peoples’ right to self-governance,
promoted by the United Nations, had allowed the emergence of a range of
new people in international discourses, and many of them had the aspiration
to create a new sovereign.114 This was also the case with Front Polisario,115
107. Simpson, supra note 57, at 580; Parfitt, supra note 57, at 598; Griffiths, supra note 100, at 209;
Rep. of the S.C. on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/2006/817 (2006).
108. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 ¶ 162 (Oct. 16); see also S.C. Res. 380, ¶ 2
(Nov. 6, 1975); Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the UnderSecretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/161 (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter “S.C. Letter Jan. 2002”].
109. See G.A. Res. 3292 (XXIX), ¶1 (Dec. 13, 1974).
110. U.N. Declaration of Principles on Western Sahara by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania, Nov. 19,
1975, U.N.T.S. 259 [hereinafter “U.N. Dec. of Principles on W. Sahara”]; G.A. Res. 35/118 (Dec. 11,
1980); G.A. Res. 52/78 (Dec. 10, 1997); G.A. Res. 54/91 (Dec. 6, 1999); G.A. Res. 55/147 (Dec. 8, 2000);
G.A. Res. 56/74 (Dec. 8, 2001); G.A. Res. 3292 (XXIX) (Dec. 13, 1974); S.C. Letter Jan. 2002, supra
note 108; Leite, supra note 96, at 13; see also Thomas M. Franck and Paul Hoffman, The Right of SelfDetermination in Very Small Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol., 331, 341 (1976).
111. On February 26, 1976, Spain withdrew its presence from the Western Sahara territory and no
longer acted as the administrative power in the territory. See U.N. Dec. of Principles on W. Sahara, supra
note 110. See also S.C. Res. 690 (Apr. 29, 1991); Leite, supra note 96, at 13.
112. G.A. Res. 2983 (XXVII) ¶ 5(a) (Dec. 14, 1972); G.A. Res. 2229 (XXI) ¶¶ 3–4, (Dec. 20, 1966);
G.A. Res. 2983 (XXVII), ¶ 5(b) (Dec.14 1972); see also Helen Quane, The UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples: New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory Rights?, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 259 (Stephen Allen
& Alexandra Xanthaki eds., 2011).
113. G.A. Res. 48/46 (Mar. 22, 1994); G.A. Res. 49/40 (Jan. 30, 1994).
114. See generally Fernández-Molina, supra note 96 (discussing the emergence of civil protests and
pro-independence activisim in the Western Sahara); Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, The Inter-generational
Politics of ‘Travelling Memories’: Sahrawi Refugee Youth Remembering Home-land and Home-camp,
34 J. INTERCULT. STUD. 631 (2013) (studying the politics of traveling memories between older and
younger generations in Western Sahara).
115. In 1975, Front Polisario declared Western Sahara as an independent country with the official
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established in 1973 as a national liberation movement in Western Sahara
aiming to end the presence of Morocco on the territory.
Despite the formal granting of rights to the newly established people,
their demands for independence were, however, generally ignored. The UN
fostered a rights-based narrative on the international plane, but many of the
rights noted in the UN Charter remained solely declaratory due to the lacking
enforcement mechanisms and the conflicting, yet apparently equally potent,
claims on rights, in particular, the right to self-determination versus the right
to territorial integrity.116
As a result, states were, on the one hand, bound to the norms of the UN
charter, but, on the other hand, the lack of compulsory ICJ jurisdiction makes
the execution of those norms, and hence the enforcement of the rights,
occasionally onerous.117 As only a handful of states had accepted the ICJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction, the right of self-governance could not
materialize.118 While it is evident that the rights of people have increased,
those rights lack a forum to be heard either internationally or domestically.
In particular from the viewpoint of actors such as the Sahrawi people, little
has changed since the decolonization process: the call for a referendum
remains unfulfilled and the rights of the Sahrawi people remain mostly
unaddressed.119 At the level of international law, enforcement through courts
name Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). SADR has been recognized by more than 80 states.
Some of those states that have recognized SADR have later withdrawn or suspended their recognition.
Irene Fernández-Molina, Protests Under Occupation: The Spring Inside Western Sahara, 20 MEDITERR.
POL. 235, 236 (2015); Anne Lippert, Sahrawi Women in the Liberation Struggle of the Sahrawi People,
17 SIGNS 636, 636 (1992); See generally AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE
MORAL GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS (1996); Charles Taylor, Politics of Recognition, in
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Charles Taylor & Amy Gutmann
eds., 1994); see also Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403 (July 22).
116. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International
Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 268 (2011) (“[I]nternational law fails on this view to be a legal regime for two
reasons: (1) it lacks its own enforcement mechanisms, and (2) it lacks internal mechanisms that employ
brute force.”). See generally JACK L GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005) (arguing that international law is less powerful and less significant than the public believe
and that the possibilities for what it can achieve are limited).
117. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 2 (1946).
118. The non-enforceability of the norms of international law has its counterpart in domestic
jurisdictions in the shape of doctrine of non-justiciability for acts of states. This doctrine suggests that a
national court has no competence to assert jurisdiction on “any actions of a governmental nature taken by
a foreign sovereign state in its own territory.” DIXON, supra note 5, at 184.
119. Nathaniel Berman, A Perilous Ambivalence: Nationalist Desire, Legal Autonomy, and the
Limits of the Interwar Framework, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 356, 377–79 (1992); Omar, supra note 95
(discussing the struggle for self-determination among the Sahrawi people); HURST HANNUM,
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remains at the discretion of the States, despite a growing number of courts
and tribunals that are in theory able to hear cases.120 There are, however,
pockets of international law emerging where the practical enforcement of
obligations may at present be the rule rather than the exception – such as
international economic law as enshrined in trade and investment agreements
and as then interpreted by courts such as the CJEU, which may take a liberal
position on standing.
B. CJEU’s reading on Western Sahara
The snapshot of present-day Western Sahara is in many ways a collage
of the past.121 Front Polisario as a non-statal entity is seeking a forum
wherein to challenge perceived injustices over the territories and fisheries of
Western Sahara. The courts of the European Union provide such an
opportunity, and they are not concerned with just economic matters. The
constitutive nature of EU law and the effectiveness of enforcing it are
features that make the Union a special sui generis international legal order.122
Thus, when the European Union concluded a bilateral treaty with the
Kingdom of Morocco that applied to the coastal waters outside of Western
Sahara, there appeared to be a legal opening for Front Polisario to, if not
claim a territory, at least negate Morocco’s power to unilaterally dictate the
economic relationships on Western Sahara’s territory.123
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS
38 (1990); see also Gnanapala Welhengama, The Legitimacy of Minorities’ Claim for Autonomy Through
the Right to Self-determination, 68 NORD. J. INT’L L. 413, 415 (1999) (noting that for minorities, without
having greater political power over their territorial autonomy, they are being deprived of their right to
self-determination); Rep. of the G.A. on the Question of Western Sahara, U.N. Doc. A/60/116 (2005);
S.C., Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, U.N. Doc. S/2006/817
(2006).
120. See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 73, (discussing the development of and trends in the creation and
role of international courts).
121. G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 37; see Omar, supra note 95, at 43–46 (providing a brief
history of the Sahrawi people culminating in their current struggle for self-determination); Sandra
Hummelbrunner & Anne-Carlijn Pickartz, It’s Not the Fish That Stinks! EU Trade Relations with
Morocco under the Scrutiny of the General Court of the European Union, 32 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR.
L. 19, 20–23 (2016) (providing a brief history of Western Sahara culminating in the current selfdetermination issues faced in the region).
122. Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transport v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., ECLI:EU:C:1963:1;
Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66 ¶ 583-584 (Feb. 5, 1963); PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE
DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 267–68 (6th ed. 2015) .
123. Peter Hilpold, “Self-determination at the European Courts: The Front Polisario Case” or “The
Unintended Awakening of a Giant”, 2 EUR. PAPERS J.L. & INTEGRATION 907, 913, 917–18 (2017).
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The legal dispute in the case was about the request of Front Polisario
to annul Council Decision 2012/497/EU on the further liberalization of trade
between the Kingdom of Morocco and the European Union through a
bilateral treaty between the parties. However, the focus of our analysis will
be on the issues of standing before the Courts, as they go to the heart of the
matter in terms of statehood and sovereignty.
The General Court and the Court of Justice differed in their
interpretations of the status of Western Sahara in the bilateral Liberalisation
Agreement124 between Morocco and the EU. In short, the General Court
considered Front Polisario to have standing in the case but annulled the
Council’s decision as far as Western Sahara was concerned.125 The Court of
Justice instead considered Western Sahara excluded from the territorial
application of the Treaty to begin with, and hence considered a case on behalf
of Western Sahara inadmissible.126 The Court of Justice would thus not grant
standing to a legal person representing a party outside of the Agreement.127
In both instances – but for different reasons – the territory of Western Sahara
was considered not to be a part of the trade agreement from the point of view
of the European Union.128 Let us have a closer look.
The General Court and the Court of Justice followed roughly the same
steps in their analyses of Article 263(4) TFEU. First, the Courts asked
whether there was a legal person to raise a claim. Second, they asked if there
was an act of the EU that could be challenged. And third, the Courts
determined whether the said act applied to Front Polisario directly and in a
way that distinguished it individually as an addressee of the decision,
sufficient to accord the organization standing on the matter.
The first question on the legal personality of Front Polisario was
discussed in greater detail in the decision of the General Court as the initial
stage of the case. The General Court reflected widely on the status of
Western Sahara and its gradual change since decolonization.129 The Court of
Justice, as the appellate court in the case, did not directly address the matter
but simply assumed the legal personality of the parties in prior
124. Agreement Between the European Union and the Kingdom of Morocco Concerning Reciprocal
Liberalisation Measures on Agricultural Products, Processed Agricultural Products, Fish and Fishery
Products, Dec. 13, 2010, 2012 O.J. (L 241) 4.
125. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, 35 (Dec. 10, 2015).
126. Case C-104/16 P, Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, ¶134 (Dec. 21, 2016).
127. Id. at ¶ 133.
128. For the outcome of the case on exports from Israeli settlements, see Case C-386/08, Firma Brita
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, 2010 E.C.R. I-01289.
129. Front Polisario I , ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 34–60.
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proceedings.130 The definition of legal personality was problematic to the
General Court, as the normal categories used to recognize people’s legal
personality were not applicable.131 There was no document incorporating
Front Polisario in accordance with the law of a State because Front
Polisario, though a private organization, claimed to be itself the
representative of the State and of a State that only aspired to exist but did not
yet formally do so.132 The same problem of incorporation is faced by all
organizations claiming to represent non-acknowledged sub-statal entities or
regions. Nonetheless, the General Court found that there was nothing as such
to prevent Front Polisario from being recognized as having standing before
the Court.133 Moreover, the General Court re-iterated that the definition of a
legal person under Article 263(4) TFEU is not confined to the notion of legal
personality recognized in a given Member State but is something defined by
the European Union.134 Also, the fact that Western Sahara and Front
Polisario as its representative had been accepted by the European Union in
other forums helped to mitigate the problem of establishing legal
personality.135
The General Court’s reading of legal personality operated between
international and European law. On the one hand, the Court seemed to
suggest that Front Polisario did not enjoy international legal personality.136
From the point of view of international law, it is not clear whether this holds
true, considering that traditionally international law has recognized insurgent
groups at least as its subjects even though they would not enjoy a full legal
personality as international organizations.137 Therefore, even if Western
Sahara were not a state, a long period of insurgency in a clearly demarcated
area would most likely lead to the recognition of Front Polisario as an
130. Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, ¶ 68.
131. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 34–38.
132. Id. at ¶ 68.
133. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶52; Case 50/84, Bensider v. Comm’n of the Eur.
Communities, 1984 E.C.R. 3991, ¶ 9; Case 135/81, Groupement des Agences de Voyages, Asbl. v.
Comm’n of the Eur. Communities, 1982 E.C.R. 3799, ¶¶ 9–12; Case C-229/05, PKK and KNK v.
Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-00439, ¶¶ 109–112; Case 175–73, Union Syndicale v. Council of the Eur.
Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 917, ¶¶ 9–17; Case 15-63, Claude Lassalle v. Parliament, 1963 E.C.J. 1964
50; Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 34–60.
134. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 51–53; Groupement des Agences de voyages, Asbl.,
1982 E.C.R. ¶¶ 9–12; PKK and KNK, 2007 E.C.R. ¶¶ 109–112.
135. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 52–57.
136. Id. at ¶ 47.
137. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 118–20 (9th ed.
2019); Sinclair, Civilizing Task, supra note 55, at 866.
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insurgent group. Additionally, the General Court took a stance different from
the Council; the latter argued138 that international legal personality does not
necessarily constitute a legal person in European Union law for contested
subjects of international law, such as Front Polisario.139 The GC, however,
seemed to give relevance to the treatment of Front Polisario under
international law and not only to the binding decisions of the EU
institutions.140 This leads to an overlay of European Union law on top of
international law when deciding issues of legal personality. Combining EU
law with international law might be prudent when facing hard cases where
the mere act of recognition before a European Union court would count as a
major victory for the claimant. But such prudence might also result in
questioning internationally the legal personality of many of the entities that
the European Union considers to embody international legal personality.
The positions of the European Commission and the Council on
international legal personality, reflected in the decisions of the Courts, are a
part of the greater debate on the fragmentation of international law. Rather
than endorsing a pre-existing reading of international legal personality and
using that as a foundation for its own interpretation of the status of Front
Polisario, the General Court decided to further develop its own
conceptualization of legal personality—a notion overlapping, but not
synonymous, with the existing one.141 The General Court referred to a party’s
capacity to bring legal proceedings through its constituting documents and
internal structures that give it independence and capacity to take
responsibility in legal relationships.142 Taking into account these qualities
and the special circumstances where the contested existence of Western
Sahara was discussed, Front Polisario was, in the General Court’s view, a
legal person that could bring an action in the sense of Article 263(4)
TFEU.143 The Court of Justice did not contest this fact on appeal—thus
leaving the matter without a definitive answer.
The creation of mutually existing, technical and ‘managerial’ legal
orders has, as noted, been subject to extensive debate in the international
legal community. The Front Polisario case illustrates that such
fragmentation can also have a positive, remedial quality for some parties in
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 43.
Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
Id. ¶¶ 54–59.
Id. ¶¶ 34–60.
Id. ¶ 51.
Id. ¶¶ 46–60.
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a dispute: the more there are courts to whose jurisdictions States are bound,
the less likely it is that the States can shield themselves from responding to
legitimate claims. On the negative side, this fragmentation leads
international law to lose sight of its more universalistic moorings.144 The
fragmentation has been accentuated through FTAs, where commercial
interests and the protection of investors have traditionally received the most
attention, while the protection of the more vulnerable members of the society
has been included only recently.145 Yet, in the present case, the economic
aspects may indeed offer the framing for an emancipatory narrative, where
actors such as Front Polisario are able to challenge the alleged vestiges of
colonialism and assert claims for statehood. This aspect in the evolution of
the international legal order has received only scant attention. Quite like the
transnational cases that have brought corporations to carry the responsibility
for their actions by piercing the corporate veil,146 cases akin to Front
Polisario might eventually pierce artificial veils of sovereignty.
Having determined and accepted the legal personality of Front
Polisario, the General Court assessed whether there existed an act of the
European Union that could be contested, and whether Front Polisario could
be considered an applicant directly and individually implicated by said act.
To do so, the General Court considered the nature of the EU-Morocco
bilateral agreement and whether it constituted a legislative or a regulatory
act, as that is, under EU law, relevant when defining a party’s standing before
the EU Courts. Making reference to its past practice,147 the General Court
determined that the EU-Morocco bilateral agreement is a legislative act, as
it had been adopted following the special legislative procedure defined in
Article 218(6)(a) TFEU.148
What then needed to be shown was whether the territory of Western
Sahara fell within the remit of such a legislative act. Here the views of the
General Court and the Court of Justice differed: the General Court
considered the agreement to apply to the Western Sahara territory,149
144. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 79, at 515.
145. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law:
A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 821–37 (2002) (explaining views on the merits and
pitfalls of economic (trade) law in developing the international legal order); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide
Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 621 (2002).
146. See, e.g., Chandler v. Cape Plc [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 (UK).
147. Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v. Parliament, 2011 E.C.R. II-05599, ¶ 65.
148. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 69–71.
149. Id. ¶¶ 73–103.
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whereas the Court of Justice did not.150 This divergence in opinion was based
on a nuanced interpretation of what under international law would be
considered to belong to a territory, not what factually occurred within the
said territory.
Both Courts relied on the rules of interpretation in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). The General Court made
reference to Article 31(1) VCLT, which requires the interpretation of treaties
in accordance with their ordinary meaning within the relevant context.151
Because the European Commission and the Council knew that Morocco was
exporting goods from Western Sahara, the General Court considered that the
European Union had come to interpret the Council Decision as well as the
Association Agreement152 between Morocco and the EU as also covering the
area of Western Sahara. As the European Commission and the Council were
also aware of the views of Morocco concerning the territory of Western
Sahara, the EU should, according to the General Court, have excluded the
territory of Western Sahara explicitly from the Council decisions if this had
been its intention.153 On the other hand, while applying the Agreement
between Morocco and the EU to Western Sahara, the Council had failed to
assess the protection of fundamental rights (of the Sahrawi people) in that
area.154 Hence, the Agreement was considered annulled for the part that
related to Western Sahara.155
Unlike the General Court, the Court of Justice used articles other than
31(1) VCLT in its interpretation of the Agreement.156 Interestingly, the Court
of Justice was adamant that there was no stark separation between
international law and European Union law. The Court of Justice referred to
Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, according to which relevant international law that is
binding upon the parties is to be taken into consideration when interpreting
a treaty.157 Further, the Court of Justice combined Article 29 VCLT, which
states that a treaty is binding in the entire territory of its parties, with the right
to self-determination from Article 1 of the U.N. Charter and ICJ case law
150. Case C-104/16 P, Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, ¶¶ 81–126 (Dec. 21, 2016).
151. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 91–98.
152. Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between the European
Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the Other Part,
Mar. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 70) 2.
153. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 99.
154. Id. ¶¶ 223–47.
155. Id. ¶¶ 247.
156. Case C-104/16 P, Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, ¶¶ 86–100 (Dec. 21, 2016).
157. Id. ¶ 86.
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(Portugal v Australia), and concluded that self-determination is a legally
enforceable right erga omnes.158 Self-determination must thus have been
interpreted to apply also to relations between the EU and Morocco, despite
the actions of Morocco.159
The main argument of the General Court160 for considering that the
parties had intended to include Western Sahara in the Agreement—the
verifiable actions and knowledge of the Commission and the Council that
Morocco was also applying the Decision in the territory of Western Sahara—
was simply shrugged off by the Court of Justice. The fact that all parties
knew that Morocco was applying the Association Agreement in the entire
territory it considered its own—Western Sahara included—was without
significance for the Court of Justice.161 The Liberalisation Agreement
between Morocco and Spain did not apply to Western Sahara.162 Essential to
this conclusion was adherence to international law and its systemic
coherence. Even though the pragmatic approach taken by the General Court
can readily be criticized for its superimposition of European Union law over
international law, the optics of the decision matter as well. According to the
General Court, a formal re-drawing of the scope of the Agreement was not
enough—the whole agreement needed to be re-assessed.
Thus, the General Court and the Court of Justice followed different
rationales. In the view of the General Court, the Council had intended to
apply the Liberalisation Agreement to Western Sahara, even if it should not
have done so due to the human rights violations in that region. The scope of
the Agreement as defined by the General Court nevertheless led it to grant
Front Polisario standing in the case.163 The Court of Justice, in contrast,
rejected this viewpoint, as it considered the Agreement to not have covered
Western Sahara to begin with.164 Nevertheless, the decisions of the General
Court and the Court of Justice led to the same substantive outcome: goods
originating from Western Sahara were no longer to be treated as part of the
Association Agreement and, therefore, were subject to customs when
imported into the EU. But this outcome was of limited consequence to
158. Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, ¶ 88. The Latin term erga omnes translates into
“towards all,” referring in law to rights and obligations that are enforceable against anybody. See Hilpold,
supra note 123 (discussing the erga omnes aspects of the decision).
159. Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, ¶¶ 89–93.
160. Id. ¶¶ 73–103.
161. Id. ¶¶ 100–26.
162. Id. ¶ 116.
163. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 114 (Dec. 10, 2015).
164. Front Polisario II, ECLI:EU:C:2016:973, ¶ 132.
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Morocco. Morocco was in practice able to push aside its violation of
international law—that is, to continue intervening in the external relations of
Western Sahara as a UN non-self-governing territory. Morocco was able to
maintain its unilateral interpretation of the territorial scope of the EUMorocco agreement, so that nothing would prevent it from, for example,
continuing to produce fish oil within the Moroccan territory, even if the fish
originated from the waters of Western Sahara.165
The third question on whether Front Polisario had standing before the
EU Courts was not addressed by the Court of Justice, as it found that the
Decision did not apply to the territory of Western Sahara. The General Court
seemed to state that the criteria of being directly and individually implicated
by the legislative act did not pose a hurdle for international actors, in
distinction from companies or natural persons. International actors are often,
as in the case of Front Polisario, uniquely capable of representing the
interests of people in a given territory.166
In summary, some conclusions can be drawn from the Front Polisario
case. The General Court accepted in practice, and the Court of Justice did
not seem hostile in principle, to the idea of a contested sub-statal entity
claiming its rights in a judicial case against a legislative act of the EU.
Further, it was conceivable for an international actor (Front Polisario) to
represent such an entity in the case. However, the open-endedness of the
Court of Justice’s decision, caused by its rejection of the territorial
applicability of the Agreement on Western Sahara to begin with, taints these
conclusions with a good dose of uncertainty.
Next, we use these observations as a framework to assess another
dispute, but this time a potential dispute: the claims for separation by the
Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia/Tshkinvali.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the period of colonial-type
communist rule over Georgia. In April 1991, Georgia gained independence
from Russia, and Abkhazia was part of the newly independent Georgia. Only
after the 1992–1994 civil war, and with the intervention of Russian troops,
did Abkhazia gain de facto separation from Georgia. With this separation,
ethnic Georgians—a significant population—were expelled from the
Abkhazian region. This issue will be addressed in further detail in the next
Section.
165. Western Sahara’s Polisario to Test EU Court Shipment, REUTERS (Jan. 18, 2017, 7:51 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/westernsahara-eu/western-saharas-polisario-to-test-eu-court-ruling-onoil-shipment-idUSL5N1F82OC.
166. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 104–14.
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The EU currently has an Association Agreement (“AA”) with Georgia.
Abkhazia and South-Ossetia have been described in the EU-Georgia AA in
the following ways by the signatories to the agreement:
“[Georgia’s] efforts to restore its territorial integrity and full and effective
control over Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali
region/South Ossetia . . . .”167
“Committed to provide the benefits of closer political association and
economic integration of Georgia with the EU to all citizens of Georgia
including the communities divided by conflict . . . ”168
“This Agreement shall apply . . . to the territory of Georgia.”169
“The application of this Agreement . . . in relation to Georgia’s regions of
Abkhazia and Tshkinvali region/South Ossetia over which the
Government of Georgia does not exercise effective control, shall
commence once Georgia ensures the full implementation and enforcement
of this Agreement . . . on its entire territory.”170
“Should a Party consider that the full implementation and enforcement of
this Agreement . . . is no longer ensured in the regions of Georgia [of
Abkhazia and Tshkinvali region/South Ossetia], that Party may request
the Association Council to reconsider the continued application of this
Agreement . . . in relation to the regions concerned.”171

As Abkhazia and Tshkinvali continue to make claims for separation in
a politically charged context, they make for an interesting case to further
analyze the potential implications of economic law on statehood.172 Could
Abkhazia173 refer to the Western Sahara case as resembling its own situation?
Would Abkhazia fall under the EU-Georgia AA, given that article 429 (1)
refers to the Georgian territory, and the application of the agreement is
suspended by the territorial clause while the Georgian government lacks de
facto control over Abkhazian territory? Could Abkhazia make, on this basis,
the claim that the EU does not respect Abkhazia’s right to self-determination
under the EU-Georgia agreement? To what extent and how could the EU law
treatment of the AA between the EU and Georgia affect the international law
167. Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy
Community and their Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia, of the Other Part recital 16, Aug. 30,
2014, 2018 O.J. (L 261) 4 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Association Agreement].
168. Id. recital 18 (emphasis added).
169. Id. art. 429(1).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id. art. 429(4) (emphasis added).
172. Id. art. 429(1).
173. The analysis here is limited to Abkhazia. The idiosyncrasies of the situations do not allow us to
describe multiple cases in sufficient detail in a single article.
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assessment of the Abkhazian region?
IV. ABKHAZIA
A. Abkhazia in the context of the EU Georgia Association Agreement
The European Union has a range of “Association Agreements”174 that
it has concluded with its neighboring countries.175 Similar to the case of
Western Sahara in Morocco, several of these countries have contested
territories within their borders. In what follows, we assess whether the
Western Sahara case might have implications as a precedent with regard to
Association Agreements. Does it establish an argument that the abovementioned contested regions could, under certain circumstances, claim
standing before the EU Courts by virtue of the AAs? Whatever one may
think about the normative claims for statehood and sovereignty – and we
take no position on that issue here – it does seem important that the geopolitical legal consequences of the economic agreements be reflected upon,
and have a place in the minds of the parties that conclude them.
While EU’s agreements with the Eastern Partnership countries are
independent of one another, they share significant similarities.176 We focus
on the provisions that refer to the territory and the area of application of the
agreements. On the one hand, those provisions refer to the internationally
recognized borders of the patron States, including the disputed territories. On
the other hand, however, the territorial clauses may limit the applicability of
the agreements in the disputed areas for as long as the State in question does
not have effective control over the region. Neither these Agreements nor the
EU-Morocco Agreement in the case of Western Sahara are fully
unambiguous about the status of the contested territories. Whereas in the case
of Western Sahara this failure emanated from the differing interpretations of
the trade partners, in the Eastern Partnership AAs the confusion ensues from
partly conflicting norms covering the territorial scope. The Association
Agreement between Georgia and the EU offers an intriguing example for
174. Association agreement is a type of international treaty that can be concluded between the EU,
the member states of the EU, and non-EU states in order to establish future cooperation.
175. The EU has three types of trade agreements: one of them is association agreements and the other
two are customs unions and partnership and cooperation agreements. For a complete list of the trade
agreements,
see
Negotiations
and
Agreements,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/negotiations-and-agreements/ (last visited Aug.
27, 2020).
176. Id.
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analyzing the Eastern Partnership AAs.
Before analyzing the case and its implications, we briefly outline the
context in Georgia. Since 1917, there has been an active conflict between
Georgia and one of its (contested) territories, Abkhazia.177 In Abkhazia, there
is a group of people that consider themselves ethnically distinct from the rest
of the Georgia population, and the Abkhazian region and Georgia have for
long been marked by fluctuating and uncertain borders.
The present situation in Abkhazia can be most meaningfully explained
in light of the Soviet Union and its collapse.178 On March 31, 1991, Georgia
held a referendum of independence, defining its leave from the then
collapsing Soviet Union. 99.5 percent of voters, including ethnic
Abkhazians, voted in favor of Georgia’s independence and supported the
restoration of Georgia’s sovereignty based on the Act of Declaration of
Independence of Georgia of 26 May 1918. Georgia left the Soviet Union in
April 1991, with Abkhazia as its integral part. Soon thereafter, in 1992, a
violent civil war erupted with the significant involvement of the Russian
army in support of Abkhazia’s secession. This marked a de facto separation
of Abkhazia from Georgia, although the region remained under the rule of
the Tbilisi government.179 For more than a decade, the status quo of frozen
relations between the two persisted. In 2008, a brief internal war nonetheless
again erupted, and it became international through the involvement of the
Russian Federation and its occupation of parts of Georgia.180
These events were followed by the recognition of the statehood of
Abkhazia by a handful of States, most notably by Russia and countries under

177. Georgia has another contested region, South Ossetia, within its internationally recognized
borders. See generally Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15, Public Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for
Authorization of an Investigation (Jan. 27, 2016) (holding that all requirements of Article 53(1) were met
and thereby granting authorization).
178. See generally RONALD GRIGOR SUNY, THE REVENGE OF THE PAST: NATIONALISM,
REVOLUTION, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION (Stanford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1993) (arguing
that nationalism caused the collapse of the Soviet Union.).
179. See generally S.C. Res. 858 (Aug. 24, 1993); U.N. President of the S.C., Note by the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/26032 (July 2, 1993); S.C. Res. 1994/583, Annex I (May 14, 1994);
S.C. Res. 937 (July 21, 1994).
180. In August 2008, the Russian Federation occupied Abkhazian territory and other areas outside
the conflict zone. On August 12, 2008, leaders of the Russian Federation and France agreed to maintain
peace in Georgia and signed six-point ceasefire agreement. See generally S.C. Draft Res. 2008/570 (Aug.
21, 2008); EU-Georgia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee Minutes of the 11th Meeting, EUR. PARL.
DOC. (2009); Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15 (regarding six-point peace plan for the Georgia-Russian
conflict).
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its sphere of influence.181 Most of the international community maintains that
Abkhazia remains a part of Georgia,182 which is the state of affairs as
reflected in the language of the Association Agreement between the EU and
Georgia.
B. Abkhazia as a party to a dispute before the EU Courts
With this context, we assess to what extent the Front Polisario case
could potentially function as a blueprint for the Abkhazian de facto
government to also bring a claim as an independent entity to the courts of
the EU. We will first briefly assess possible substantive claims that Abkhazia
could use for this purpose, before turning to assess the possible standing of
Abkhazia and the capacity of the de facto Abkhazian government to
represent the interests of the region before the courts of the EU. We conclude
that establishing standing for Abkhazia in this manner seems a convoluted
process, and therefore its prospects seem weak. In fact, we come to the
conclusion that the aspect of international external recognition, which was
the ultimate threshold of statehood historically, re-surfaces. The Abkhazian
case shows that even in the situation of fragmented legal regimes, external
recognition remains a consideration when assessing the Montevideo
Convention’s formal criteria. Conversely, interference by third countries and
the absence of general international recognition have relevance when
standing is debated in the EU Courts.
C. The substantive grounds
Perhaps the most plausible of the substantive claims that the Abkhazian
181. On August 26, 2008 the Russian Federation recognized Abkhazia as an independent state.
182. See ს ა ქ ა რ თვ ე ლო ს კ ო ნ ს ტ ი ტ უ ც ი ა [CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA], Oct. 17, 1995,
Matsne No. 786-ES, art. 1 (1995) (Geor.) (defining Georgia as an “independent, unified, and indivisible
state, as confirmed by the Referendum of 31 March 1991 held throughout the territory of the country,
including the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia and the Former Autonomous Region
of South Ossetia, and by the Act of Restoration of State Independence of Georgia of 9 April 1991”). See
generally S.C. Res. 881 (Nov. 4, 1993); S.C. Res. 937 (July 21, 1994); S.C. Res. 1036 (Jan. 12, 1996);
S.C. Res. 1065 (July 12, 1996); S.C. Res. 1077 (Oct. 22, 1996); S.C. Res. 1494 (July 30, 2003); S.C. Res.
15424 (Jan. 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1554 (July 29, 2004); S.C. Res. 1582 (Jan. 28, 2005); S.C. Res. 1615
(July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1666 (Mar. 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1716 (Oct. 13, 2006); S.C. Res. 1752 (Apr.
13, 2007); S.C. Res. 1752 (Oct. 15, 2007); S.C. Res. 1808 (Apr. 15, 2008); S.C. Res. 849 (July 9, 1993);
S.C. Res. 854 (Aug. 6, 1993); S.C. Res. 858 (Aug. 24, 1993); S.C. Res. 876 (Oct. 19, 1993); S.C. Res.
(Nov. 4, 1993); S.C. Res. 892 (Dec. 22, 1993); Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/1996/507 (1996); Rep. of
S.C., U.N. Doc. S/1996/644 (1996); Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2006/173 (2006).
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de facto government could raise against the EU (so as to be able to bring a
case by virtue of Article 263(4) TFEU) is that the EU be held liable for
sustaining the economic isolation of Abkhazia through the EU-Georgia AA.
The preamble of the EU-Georgia AA recognizes the territorial integrity of
Georgia, including the region of Abkhazia.183 The AA contends to apply to
all of Georgia,184 and supports a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the
restoration of Georgia’s effective control over Abkhazia. Article 429(2) of
the AA then establishes the limited application of the agreement in Abkhazia
until Georgia re-establishes a full and effective control over the region. By
explicitly excluding Abkhazia from the scope of application of the AA, the
Agreement could perhaps be argued to lead to a direct economic impairment
on Abkhazia. Further, the argument on the impairment of the region’s
economic relations could potentially also include the Law of Georgia on
Occupied Territories,185 as that imposes limits on trade from and to
Abkhazia. This Georgian law might be argued to be akin to the limitations
on Western Saharan self-government imposed by the Moroccan government.
The de facto Abkhazian government thus might argue that the application of
the AA jointly with the Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories leads to
economic limitations that are contrary to the self-determined will of that
government. The EU however does not recognize Abkhazia’s right to selfdetermination, and accordingly seeks to restrict the application of the AA to
the territory where the Georgian government exercises both de jure and de
facto control.186
While there might be some logical and legal merit to these claims, an
argument on economic limitations nonetheless seems to have major
weaknesses. The moratorium on trade with Abkhazia has not had an impact
on the small-scale trade conducted by individuals living in the territory
controlled by the Abkhazian de facto government. For example, produce
such as nuts continue to be traded across the border to Georgia, and from
there further to the European and international markets.187 This seems to
suggest that there are direct economic benefits from the EU-Georgia AA to
the people living in the Abkhazian region. In the Front Polisario case, the
183. Association Agreement, supra note 167, pmbl.
184. Id. art. 419.
185. Law on Occupied Territories, No. 431-IIS, art. 6 (2008) (Geor.).
186. Association Agreement, supra note 167, art. 419.
187. Ketevan Khutsishvili, Suddenly a Border: Hazelnut Trade Across the De Facto Border Between
Abkhazia and the Zugdidi Municipal Region of Georgia, 96 CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIG 9, 9–11 (2017);
see also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA: TIME TO TALK TRADE 5–11
(2018).
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fact that the economic benefit from the sale of goods originating from
Western Sahara was not reaped by the local people was a decisive fact in
GC’s condemnation of the Moroccan practice.188 The situation in the EUGeorgia AA might be different, to the extent that it would not hinder the
economic interests of Abkhazians. Nonetheless, trade from Abkhazia might
face other obstacles, for example on respecting the rules of origin. We shall
assess these questions further below.
D. Standing
Let us then assess the question of standing that took center-stage in the
Front Polisario case. As explained above, the criteria of standing for a claim
to be admissible before the Court of Justice of the European Union include,
first, that there exists an applicant—a natural person or a legal person that is
entitled to bring a claim.189 Second, there needs to be an act of the EU that
can be challenged. Third, depending on the type of the act, it must either
individually and directly concern the applicant, only directly concern the
applicant – or neither.190
1. The de facto government of Abkhazia as an applicant
The interpretation of the first criteria for standing, namely, the existence
of a person or an entity capable of representing Abkhazia, would find some
guidance in Front Polisario. The Abkhazian de facto government would
seek to rely on the (claimed) status of Abkhazia as a State, therewith
commanding international legal personality par excellence. The merits of
this particular argument, however, seem weak.
The issues in the nature of the de facto Abkhazian government’s role
can be approached by analyzing the recognition and then the representation
of that State. As to external recognition, the EU and the majority of the
international community do not recognize Abkhazia as a sovereign state,
even if the region is noted in the AA. They have openly supported Georgia’s
internal sovereignty and borders.191 Abkhazia has neither acceded to any
188. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 208–47 (Dec. 10, 2015).
189. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 263, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1.
190. DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND
MATERIALS 388–97 (4th ed. 2019).
191. International society recognizes Georgia’s international borders including Abkhazia. A handful
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multilateral treaties nor does it have a status in any international
organizations that would count towards an acknowledgment of its
international status.192 Reflecting these circumstances, the European Union
presumes that the sovereignty of Georgia extends over its entire territory,
including Abkhazia. Georgia’s external sovereignty curtails the Abkhazian
region’s capacity to command its own external relations, as internationally
Abkhazia is predominantly perceived an internal affair of Georgia. The
Georgian government in Tbilisi remains the sole, widely internationally
recognized sovereign, exercising de jure control over Abkhazia.193 At the
same time, Abkhazia is recognized by a small group of states, in particular
Russia, and is in that context also party to several agreements.194 These latter
facts would speak in favor of considering the de facto Abkhazian
government to be an entity that fulfills the criteria of being independent and
able to take on responsibilities.195 However, the independence is, from a
geopolitical perspective, questionable due to the strong influence of Russia
in the Abkhazian affairs, and indeed in creating its existence.
Hand-in-hand with the external recognition of the Republic of Georgia
as an entity covering certain geographical area comes the recognition of its
internal sovereignty to provide rules for everyone within the jurisdiction. The
situation in Abkhazia could be understood as a limitation to the internal
sovereignty of Georgia if the de facto Abkhazian government in practice
commanded the internal policies of the Abkhazian region. However, similar

of countries recognized Abkhazia after August 2008 (Vanuatu and Tuvalu withdrew its recognition).
192. However, Abkhazia has several treaties with Russia. E.g., Agreement between the Government
of Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Abkhazia on the Regime of Trade in Goods,
Republic of Abkhazia-Russ., May 28, 2012, BJULLETEN MEZHDUNARODNYH DOGOVOROV [BMD]
[BULLETIN OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES] 2014, No. 8, Item 29; Agreement between the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on Joint Efforts in Protecting the State Border of the Republic
of Abkhazia, Republic of Abkhazia-Russ., Apr. 30, 2009, BMD 2009, No. 10, Item 85; Law on
Ratification of Russia-Abkhazia Agreement on Joint Group of Forces, Nov. 22, 2016; BMD 2017, No. 1,
Item 13; Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the
Republic of Abkhazia on the Provision of Assistance to the Republic of Abkhazia in the Socio-Economic
Development, Republic of Abkhazia-Russ., Aug. 12, 2009, BMD 2010, No. 1, Item 82.
193. Georgia became the 179th member of the United Nations on July 31, 1992. See generally
Christian Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to the International Community, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L.
491 (1998) (discussing the UN’s practice of recognition and its import in the context of the collapse of
the Soviet Union).
194. Abkhazia is recognized by the Russian Federation, Venezuela, and Nicaragua since 2008 and
Nauru since 2009. Pacific Island Recognises Georgian Rebel Region, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2009, 4:19 AM)
https://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-44730620091215?edition-redirect=in
(noting
that Nauru joined Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela in recognizing Abkhazia).
195. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 54 (Dec. 10, 2015).
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to what is stated above about its external sovereignty, the internal
sovereignty of Abkhazia may be debatable since its capacity to effectively
control the territory may be dependent on the role of a third party, the
Russian Federation, in Abkhazia. Russia deems Abkhazia an independent
State and does not recognize the authority of the Tbilisi Government on
Abkhazia.196 Russia thus provides active support to Abkhazia, and this
support appears a prerequisite for Abkhazia to continue to exist
independently of Georgia.
That the situation in Abkhazia is strongly influenced by Russia197 is an
argument for which the annexation of Crimea to Russia gives further
credence. Quite like many African states that were contracting their lands
and resources to the colonial masters, the economic and military interference
of the Russian Federation questions the independence of Abkhazia to
formulate a truly free will of its own. Accordingly, it would seem difficult to
entertain an argument that, even if one considered there to be an Abkhazian
people, that there is also an Abkhazian State. Abkhazia lacks the precise
character of being internationally recognized.
Then again, the sovereignty of Western Sahara is not fully recognized,
either. The General Court nonetheless considered that Front Polisario was a
“legal person” that could represent the case of Western Sahara.198 Western
Sahara was also individually concerned by the contested decision.199 The
General Court noted that the international status of the Western Sahara
territory must be determined in UN-led negotiations between the Kingdom
of Morocco and Front Polisario.200 No comparable negotiations have been
established between Georgia and Abkhazia under the UN or any other
international organizations to determine the international status of the region.
The issue of standing thus collapses in this respect back to the political
question on the external recognition of the contested area by the international
community. The existence of the Association Agreement does not by itself
196. The Russian Federation recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states on
August 26, 2008. See generally TAMAR PAPAVADZE & LYUDMILA SERGEEVA, TREATY ON ALLIANCE
AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ABKHAZIA: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS (2015)
(discussing the Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership between Russia and Abkhazia).
197. See Kavus Abushov, Policing the Near Abroad: Russian Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus,
63 AUSTRALIAN J. INT’L AFFS. 187, 187 (2009) (“The absence of Moscow’s impartiality in its military
and political presence in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts has pushed Georgia to seek
alternative alliances to balance Russian influence.”).
198. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 34–60.
199. Id. ¶¶ 69 –71, 104–114.
200. Id. ¶¶ 110–114.
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determine the outcome of the question of sovereignty, even if it initially may
seem to support such a conclusion. Rather, at this juncture the issue of
sovereignty becomes a consideration in determining the standing for the
entity claiming its rights, if the entity’s claim is based on the argument that
it represents the State in question.
This brings us to the second part of the two-fold criterion on
representation. Here the question revolves around whose voice ought to be
heard as the representative of Abkhazia. Should the present de facto
government of Abkhazia be the representative of the interests of the territory
and/or the population in the area it currently governs? An argument
suggesting that it represents both the territory and the people seems difficult
to defend before the Court.201
Obviously, the full support of everyone living in a territory is not
expected for the fulfillment of the representativeness criteria. Unanimity is
not a standard used in international law for recognizing governments in case
of peaceful transitions of power. It can then hardly act as a standard in much
more volatile de facto distributions of powers. Being a representative of a
region means that the people therein have had the chance to participate in the
democratic election of their representatives.202 In other words, the
representation, and through that, the individual concern (discussed further
below) builds upon sufficiently wide-ranging support within the region for
its elected or chosen representatives.
This brings forth an additional layer of present-day statecraft: the
presumption of a (pluralist) democracy. In the case of Western Sahara, it was
uncontested that Front Polisario was the representative of the Sahrawi
people. With Abkhazia, the situation of the de facto Abkhazian government
seems more complicated. This stems from the fact that many of the ethnically
Georgian population are not allowed to enter Abkhazia and many of the
ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia presently live as internally displaced
persons outside Abkhazia.203 These types of limitations to exercising the
201. According to Jones, “[i]n 1989, [Abkhazians] numbered 17.8 percent of the Abkhazian
republican population,” while at the same time Georgians made 45.7 percent of Autonomous republic’s
population. Stephen F. Jones, Revolutions in Revolutions Within Revolution: Minorities in the Georgian
Republic, in THE POLITICS OF NATIONALITY AND THE EROSION OF THE USSR 77, 84 (1992).
202. On the abundant literature on political representation, see for example SUZANNE DOVI,
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION (Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. 2018); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, SUSAN CAROL
STOKES & BERNARD MANIN, DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1999).
203. Based on official statistics of the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons’ Issues of Georgia,
Georgia has 273,411 Internally Displaced Persons. See MINISTRTY OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED
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right to vote and ability to return home are evidently important.204 To
construct a de facto Abkhazian government as representative while it
excludes large, potentially majority (ethnically Georgian) groups in the area
would dilute claims for representativeness. The difference to the situation in
Western Sahara is here clear. Unlike the Abkhazian de facto government,
Front Polisario is the internationally widely recognized representative of
Sahrawi People.205 Additionally, Western Sahara has for long been a part of
the UN’s list of non-self-governing territories, while Abkhazia is not on the
list.206
Yet, the non-recognition of Abkhazia as a state by the European Union
Member States would not alone vacate its argument for legal personality
under EU law. The EU Court of Justice interprets the concept of legal
personality independently of the legal systems of the Member States. An
entity without an established legal personality in the Member States can still
be regarded as a legal person in the EU Courts.207 As the General Court
declared in the Front Polisario case, legal personality in EU law can be
established
in particular, where by their acts or actions, the European Union and its
institutions treat the entity in question as being a distinct person, which
may have rights specific to it, or be subject to obligations or restrictions.208

PERSONS, NUMBER OF REGISTERED IDPS-STATISTICS BY REGION (2014) (Geor.). Return of IDPs has not
taken place. G.A. Res. 71/290 (June 2, 2017); United Nations Expert Calls for Transition to Needs-based
Approaches to Address the Situation of IDPs in Georgia, OHCHR (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/2016/10/united-nations-expert-calls-transition-needs-based-approachesaddress-situation-idps.
204. See, e.g., GIORGI GOGIA, LIVING IN LIMBO: RIGHTS OF ETHNIC GEORGIANS RETURNEES TO THE
GALI DISTRICT OF ABKHAZIA 32–35 (2011).
205. SADC has for a long been the member of the African Union and as such recognized as a member
of African community of nations (SADC became member of the AU in 1982 February, 22). However, on
one hand, African states support Western Sahara’s claims. E.g., Declaration of the SADC Solidarity
Conference
with
Western
Sahara,
Mar.
25–26,
2019,
https://www.sadc.int/files/4915/5376/3232/Declaration_on_SADC_Western_Sahara_Solidarity_Confer
ence_held_in_Pretoria_South_Africa.pdf. On the other hand, after Morocco’s readmission in the AU, the
close economic relations between the priorities of many African states’ priorities and Morocco then
supported Western Sahara’s claims for independence. Franck Kuwonu, Morocco Flexed Economic
Muscles and Returned to the AU, UN AFR. RENEWAL MAG. (Dec. 2016–Mar. 2017),
https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2016-march-2017/morocco-flexed-economicmuscles-and-returned-au.
206. For
the
list,
see
Non-Self-Governing
Territories,
U.N.,
https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
207. See generally Case 135/81, Groupement des Agences de Voyages, Asbl. v. Comm’n of the Eur.
Communities, 1982 E.C.R. 3799; Case C-229/05, PKK and KNK v. Council, 2007 E.C.R. I-00439.
208. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 52 (Dec. 10, 2015).
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In accordance with this interpretation, persistent and continued
connections between the European Union and the Abkhazian de facto
government might, after all, suffice to fulfill the initial step of standing
criteria.209 As the European Union provides monetary support to Abkhazia
(delivered either through a proxy such as the United Nations Development
Programme or Red Cross, or directly as health care and infrastructure
projects210) these connections could be arguments in favour of considering
the de facto Abkhazian government as a legal person that can raise a case,
despite the range of aforementioned considerations that push against its
recognition and representativeness.
In summary, it appears that virtually any sub-regional units that are
reasonably organized would fulfill this first criterion of being a natural or a
legal person having the capacity to bring forth legal proceedings, as the
CJEU seems to state in Front Polisario. Although bringing a case before an
international tribunal requires significant coordination, this first criterion
seems a fairly unlikely hurdle to stumble on while trying to gain standing.
Should this view—which may appear quite liberal for many experts —be
retained, the focus would turn to the next steps in the process.
2. Act of the EU (open to challenge)
The second question the Court would need to address in determining
standing is whether there exists an act of the EU to be contested. Similar to
the Western Sahara case, the act of the EU that is potentially open to
challenge in the Abkhazian case is the bilateral agreement between Georgia
and the EU. The Association Agreement was signed as a Council decision211
following the procedures under Title V International Agreements of the
TFEU, with specific reference to Articles 218(5) and 218(8), and concluded
in accordance with Article 218(6)(2)(a) with the consent of the European
Parliament on 23 May 2016.212 There is thus no doubt that the created rule
209. Id.
210. Rep. of the S.C., ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/570 (2004); Rep. of the S.C., ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/2004/26
(2004); Rep. of the S.C., ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/657 (2005); Rep. of the S.C.,¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/833
(2004); Rep. of the S.C., ¶¶ 25–29, U.N. Doc. S/2006/435 (2006); Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/1994/80
(1994); Rep. of the S.C., U.N. Doc. S/2006/19 (2006).
211. Council Decision 2014/494, Signing on behalf of the European Union, and Provisional
Application of the Association Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic
Energy Community and Their Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia, of the Other Part, 2014 O.J.
(L 261) 1.
212. Council Decision 2016/838, Concluding on Behalf of the European Union, of the Association
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produces legal effects, so that it is a legally binding Act that can be
challenged before the Court. Like the Western Sahara case, questions next
arise upon the application of the enacted AA to Abkhazia.
3. Direct and individual concern
The Georgia–EU AA has been concluded, like the EU-Morocco
Agreement, by a decision of the Council after obtaining the consent of the
European Parliament. This procedure satisfies the criteria of a special
legislative procedure set out in Article 289(2) TFEU. The Georgia-EU
Association Agreement can be challenged by EU institutions as privileged
and semi-privileged applicants, and in certain situations also by nonprivileged applicants.213 A non-privileged applicant can have standing if that
natural or legal person is the immediate addressee of the act.214 A nonprivileged applicant that is not the immediate addressee of the act can have
standing, if the act is of direct and individual concern to it.215
Here, it does not seem likely that a de facto government in a region
(Abkhazia) whose sovereignty is not acknowledged by the European Union
can be considered the immediate addressee of an EU act. This possibility
cannot perhaps be entirely excluded, however. The region concerned is an
addressee in the sense that the Agreement regulates trade within the entire
Georgian territory, Abkhazia included, even if the applicability of the
Agreement on Abkhazia is pending, or temporarily suspended, depending on
the provision in question. In the latter provisions, Abkhazia is also explicitly
referred to–even if in the negative sense of excluding/suspending the
applicability.216
Assuming that the Abkhazian de facto government would not be
Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and Their
Member States, of the One Part, and Georgia, of the Other Part, 2016 O.J. (L 141) 26.
213. CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 190, 388–97.
214. Id.
215. See generally CRAIG & DE BÚRCA, supra note 122 (providing an analysis and explanation of
European law). If the challenged act were considered a regulatory act that does not require
implementation (which is not the case here, and hence excluded from the discussion), the party would
since the Lisbon Treaty only need to show direct (but not individual) concern. Albertina Albors-Llorens,
Judicial Before the Court of Justice of the European Union, in EUROPEAN LAW 262–83 (Catherine
Barnard & Steve Peers eds., 2d ed. 2017).
216. The Council decision to adopt the Association Agreement, between the European Union and the
European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other
part does not appear to be a regulatory act—and even if it were, there seems to be discretion on Georgia
when implementing it via the Association Council of the Association Agreement.

KALIMO READY FOR ADOBE(DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

12/19/2022 10:10 PM

SOVEREIGNTY IN THE ERA OF FRAGMENTATION

397

considered an immediate addressee, the EU Courts would next need to assess
whether it would be directly and individually concerned by the EU act.
It seems important to first assess whether the language of the
Agreement addresses the territory of Abkhazia. There seem to be conflicting
ways to interpret some of the norms on the territorial scope of the EUGeorgia agreement.
It seems evident, on the one hand, that Abkhazia is directly implicated
by the EU-Georgia AA. According to the Preamble and Article 429(1) of the
Agreement:
“ . . . [T]he commitment of Georgia . . . and its efforts to restore its
territorial integrity and full and effective control over Georgian regions of
Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region . . . . “
“1. This Agreement shall apply . . . to the territory of Georgia.”

In the preamble, the territory of Georgia is equated with the full
internationally recognized area of Georgia, Abkhazia included. Article
429(1) quoted above then simply refers to the full territory of Georgia. The
territorial scope of the AA covers the Abkhazian region, but Article 429(2)
complicates this straightforward interpretation:
“2. The application of this Agreement, or of Title IV (Trade and Traderelated Matters) thereof, in relation to Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia over which the Government of Georgia
does not exercise effective control, shall commence once Georgia ensures
the full implementation and enforcement of this Agreement, or of Title IV
(Trade and Trade-related Matters) thereof, respectively, on its entire
territory.”

The application of the Agreement is thus limited until Georgia ensures
the full implementation and enforcement of the Agreement on its entire
territory.217 A literal interpretation of the text would not seem to subject the
application of the AA to the Georgians re-establishing full-fledged control
over the Abkhazian territory. There is a subtle difference between Article
429(2) and the language used in the preamble. The preamble refers to
Georgia’s commitment to “territorial integrity and full and effective control
over Georgian regions of Abkhazia . . . . “218 However, the text in Article
429(2) refers, in a somewhat circular fashion, back to the “implementation
and enforcement” of the AA itself.219 One could thus understand this to

217. Association Agreement, supra note 167, art. 429(2).
218. Id. recital (16).
219. Id. art. 429(2).
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already mean that when the enforcement of the AA, or even just a part thereof
like the Title IV on Trade Matters, is ensured—perhaps through an
agreement with those with de facto power in Abkhazia—the AA is also
considered applicable to the Abkhazian region. Parties close to the
negotiations of the AA noted on this point, however, that the meaning of the
text was indeed to subject the application of the AA to Georgia’s de facto
control of the region.220
The ambiguity in the AA is different from that of the EU-Morocco
agreement, which did not specify the area of Morocco at all.221
Consequently, Morocco and the European Union ended up with differing
understandings of the territorial scope of the agreement—whether or not it
covered the area of Western Sahara. Another difference is that as Georgia
does not currently effectively control the area of Abkhazia, it has limited
possibilities to dictate the use of resources and goods in Abkhazia, unlike
Morocco’s control of trade in Western Sahara. There are thus possible
ambiguities in the norms covering the territorial scope of the AA, but the
ambivalence is not identical to the case of Western Sahara.
Were one to follow the interpretation of these Articles, according to
which the application of the AA is limited to the area under Georgian
effective control, how ought the transfers of goods over the porous border to
be seen? Do such sales of goods endorse the temporal suspension outlined in
Article 429(2)?
One way to answer the questions could be to address (the legality of)
these economic activities in the contested territories. Virtually all trade
relations of the whole Georgian territory, including Abkhazia, remain under
the rule of the Tbilisi government. The Law of Georgia on Occupied
Territories222 defines that all economic relations with Abkhazia are subject
to a prior approval by the Georgian Government.223 Any economic activity
in Abkhazia without a permission from the Tbilisi Government is illegal.224
There is for example small-scale farm trade across the border, but this trade
220. Interview with [anonymous], Civil Servant, Eur. Comm’n, in Brussels (July 17, 2020)
(anonymity due to the official’s role in the negotiations).
221. Fisheries Partnership Agreement Between the European Communities and the Kingdom of
Morocco, July 18, 2005, 2006 O.J. (L 141) 4, 11.
222. Law on Occupied Territories, No. 431-IIS (2008) (Geor.); see generally Nina Caspersen,
Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus, 50 SURVIVAL 113 (2008) (analyzing the processes of state
building and democratisation in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh).
223. GOV’T OF GEOR., STATE STRATEGY ON OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: ENGAGEMENT THROUGH
COOPERATION (2010).
224. Law on Occupied Territories, art. 6 (Geor.).
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is outright illegal under Article 6 of the Georgian Law on Occupied
Territories.225 Therefore, it cannot be made effective evidence for
establishing the territorial scope of the AA, and thus for a violation of
Abkhazia’s status.
Reversely, with permission from the Georgian Government, trading
from occupied territories would be legal domestically. This would allow,
from the vantage point of Georgian legislation for example, the transport of
agricultural produce from Abkhazia to the rest of Georgia and onwards.
Would this then mean that the AA is for these parts being “fully implemented
and enforced” in Abkhazia as well? Probably not, as the Georgian Law on
Occupied Territories stipulates that even such domestically legal actions
expand the territorial scope of the AA only through a referral to a specific
Council, established in the Agreement.226 Internal trade thus has only a
limited effect on the interpretation of the international AA between Georgia
and the EU.
Further, and partly due to deficient controls on the border between
Georgia and Abkhazia, goods produced in Abkhazia can in practice be
transported to the European Union markets, even when the AA did not allow
for that. The de facto separation of Abkhazia from Georgia has thus had only
a limited effect on the everyday trade across the border.227
Article 429(3) gives the Parties discretion to change the territorial scope
of the AA regarding Trade and Trade related matters, in case Georgia
establishes a full implementation and enforcement of this Agreement (or of
its Trade clauses) on the entire territory of Georgia, including Abkhazia.228
This is the same, potentially ambiguous language as was found in Article
429(2).229 The Association Council—a dispute settlement mechanism
established in the Article 404 of the AA—decides on whether these
conditions are fulfilled and whether to then change the territorial scope of
the AA.230 Two scenarios emerge. First, if the Association Council so agrees,
Georgia could legalize specific Abkhazian products and declare that they
originate from Georgia. The clause limiting the territorial scope of the AA

225. See id.
226. Id.
227. See generally Khutsishvili, supra note 187 (discussing how trade interacts with formal
institutions, including borders).
228. Association Agreement, supra note 167, art. 429(3).
229. See id. art. 429(2).
230. Id. art. 429(3).
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would no longer apply in such cases.231 It is unlikely that the Georgian state
would propose or agree to this. The Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories
would lose its force in practice. This would cause considerable difficulties in
a situation where Tbilisi de facto does not control Abkhazia.
The second scenario would be that Georgia sought no change on the
territorial scope of the AA, so that Abkhazia would remain excluded from
the scope of the AA. Based on the Georgian Law on Occupied Territories,
Georgia could still legalize part of the trade domestically in Abkhazia.232
Protocol I of the AA regulates the origin of the goods under the
Agreement.233 In Protocol I, the territory of Georgia seems to already
provisionally refer to Georgia’s full international territory that includes
Abkhazia, not to the more limited scope outlined in the Territorial clause of
Article 429(2).234
In sum, the (territorial) clauses in the AA are manifold, complicated and
even ambivalent. The Morocco–EU AA stays silent on whether it covers the
territory of Western Sahara or not; in the EU–Georgia AA, Georgia may
under certain interpretations have the possibility to cover Abkhazian territory
and the goods emanating therefrom, even when the territorial (limitation)
clause may be valid regarding some other aspects of the AA. The matter
depends ultimately on the way that the EU Court would interpret these
clauses. This type of case-by-case clause is typical in EU trade agreements,
not only on the inclusion of Abkhazia.
We can next widen our analysis of the criteria “of direct and individual
concern.” Being directly concerned is clearer than that of being individually
concerned. All of the legal ramifications of either including or excluding
Abkhazia from the Agreement would seem to directly concern the de facto
government of Abkhazia. The legal situation of that government would be
affected. Yet are these limitations also definite and do they restrict the rights
stemming from the AA immediately, while they “leave no discretion to [the]
addressees” of the decision, the Government of Georgia?235 This question
231. A clause to limit territorial scope of the Association Agreement can be re-introduced in
accordance with the Association Agreement art. 429(4).
232. The domestically legalized goods would cause problems if they were transported into the EU
because formally they do not originate from the Abkhazian region, but from Georgia, as during this
limited period the full territorial scope of the AA is valid.
233. Association Agreement , supra note 167, 429(2), Protocol I.
234. Id.
235. Case T-512/12, Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 105 (Dec. 10, 2015). The restriction
on the rights of the claimant and the discretion granted to the addressee were the two aspects raised by
the General Court in the Front Polisario case when assessing whether the Council act was a direct concern
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seems to hinge on how one interprets the room for discretion granted to the
Georgian government, on the one hand via the Territoriality Clause of Article
294(3) of the AA, and on the other hand via the decisions of the Association
Council. A decision that concerns an international agreement between two
states (the EU and Georgia) can as such have legal effects on the de facto
government of Abkhazia.236 The conditions of trade between Abkhazia and
the EU would be affected, for example.
Second, the Council Decision would need to be of individual concern
to the applicant claiming standing.237 Whether the Abkhazian de facto
government is the party individually concerned seems more debatable. It
appears likely that the de facto government of Abkhazia is affected by
“attributes which are peculiar to them” or “by reason of circumstances in
which they are differentiated from all other persons.”238 There is only the de
facto government of Abkhazia to make the claim for governing that area,
besides the Georgian government in Tbilisi. In the background of this last
point are the considerations that were discussed earlier in the context of the
representativeness of the Abkhazian de facto government. Can that
government be considered to represent the interests of the Abkhazian
people?
It was posited above that limiting the notion of people in Abkhazia only
to those currently left in the area, with the exclusion of ethnical Georgians
and other groups that have left, does seem dubious. If the individual concern
requires “attributes peculiar to a group” or “circumstances that distinguish
the persons,”239 then the claim of the de facto government would in our view
formally relate to the concerns of not all the people in Abkhazia, but only
those remaining under the de facto leadership of the current de facto
government. The issue may initially seem reversed from the usual
contemplation, where the people concerned form too wide and open-ended a
group to be “individually” concerned. Now it seems that those “individually
concerned” is an under-inclusive denomination.
Yet, on a closer look, also here the same issue of lack of precision arises;
the individual concern is in fact not specific to those living in Abkhazia, or
to Front Polisario.
236. Id. ¶ 106.
237. CHALMERS, DAVIES & MONTI, supra note 190, at 388–97; Albors-Llorens, supra note 215, at
276–82.
238. See Case 25/62, Plaumann & Co. v. Comm’n, 1963 E.C.R. 95, ¶ 107; Front Polisario I,
ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 112.
239. See Plaumann, 1963 E.C.R. ¶ 107; Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶ 112.
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to “Abkhazian people,” but an open-ended group that can be defined in a
generalized and abstract manner240 as including all those that have economic
or other interests in, or may in the future move (back) to live in Abkhazia.
The Abkhazian de facto government could probably make the counter-claim
that in its view, it is able and entitled to define who constitutes the closed
group of Abkhazian people with an individual concern.
E. Summarizing views
If the admissibility of an entity as a legal person in an EU judicial
procedure was the first step in professing claims towards statehood, the
entity’s ability to be individually and directly concerned in the case
constitute the steps that follow. An entity that can establish itself as having a
separate, individual concern and show that the EU act affects it directly
would seem to have also a stronger case for claiming its existence as a state.
Thus, standing in an EU court of law can be used as a means to promote
standing under international law. Front Polisario used this strategy by
challenging the EU-Morocco trade agreement, and here we examined if
Abkhazia could conceivably do the same via the EU-Georgia AA.
In the end, a careful analysis reveals that it is difficult to be fully
conclusive about the case of Abkhazia in light of the Front Polisario
decision. It appears perhaps possible, but rather improbable, that there were
grounds for the de facto government in Abkhazia to raise a claim and gain
standing before the CJEU, based on the criteria outlined in Front Polisario.
Our analysis illustrates that a predominantly economic law Treaty, such as
an Association Agreement, may indeed have bearing on issues of statehood
and sovereignty, even if for Abkhazia this would not be the case. The
available substantive claims (such as excluding the Abkhazian region from
the AA or the complex interpretations of the rules of origin in the AA) that
could emerge in the present situation in Georgia seem also much more
limited than those in the case of Western Sahara.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This article set out to explore how the secessionist aspirations of substatal entities may be influenced by the proliferation of bi- and plurilateral
economic treaties. The proliferation denotes a functional fragmentation of
law, which may in turn lead to a new type of a relativization of sovereignty.
240. Cases 789 and 790/79, Calpak SpA v. Comm’n, 1980 E.C.R. 1949, ¶ 9.
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If in a Kelsenian conceptualization the sovereignty of States is relativised by
the political power of the recognizing states, sovereignty today may be also
relativised by the fact that sovereignty is assessed by tribunals within
multiple functionally separate fields of law. Tribunals in one field (such as
investment law or trade law) may recognize an entity that a tribunal in
another field, such as the international criminal law, would not, and vice
versa. This puts the governments of the States that are Parties to the
international agreements into a politically, and even legally, delicate
position. Does the decision to grant standing to an entity in a (quasi-)judicial
decision of such a tribunal in itself constitute an act of recognizing the entity
as a sovereign State? Probably not. Yet, as the decision will politically, and
often even legally, bind the Parties, it seems unavoidable that it will affect
the positions of the governments in question. The (sub-)statal entities’
sovereignty may thus vary depending on the diversity of and the views taken
in the fields of law that they are subjected to.
We focused in this article on a recent case; the decisions of the EU’s
General Court and the Court of Justice regarding Western Sahara (Front
Polisario). We then analyzed the implications of that court case on the fragile
situation in Abkhazia, a region of Georgia with secessionist claims. The
economic treaty pertinent to the Abkhazian case is the Association
Agreement between Georgia and the European Union.
In the Western Sahara case, the General Court considered the people’s
liberalization front of the Sahrawi people, Front Polisario, to be a legal
person, capable of bringing an action on behalf of Western Sahara as a nonprivileged applicant under Article 263(4). Front Polisario’s independence
and capacity to act as a responsible entity in legal relationships241 were
determining factors for the General Court, not its legal personality under
international law. The Court of Justice did not dispute this conclusion. This
was a fundamental aspect of the case. The General Court and the Court of
Justice differed, however, in their conclusions as to whether Front Polisario
was also directly and individually concerned in the case. The General Court
considered that the criteria of being directly and individually implicated did
not pose a hurdle for an international party such as Front Polisario to bring
an action. The conclusion of the Court of Justice was that the area of Western
Sahara fell outside of the contested agreement to begin with. Hence, Front
Polisario as a representative of Western Sahara could not be directly and
individually affected, even if it were able to represent the Sahrawi people.
241. Front Polisario I, ECLI:EU:T:2015:953, ¶¶ 51–52.
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On the other hand, the exclusion of Western Sahara from the scope of the
EU-Morocco Agreement also meant that Morocco’s territorial claims on
Western Sahara and its natural resources were rejected, and the EU was
directed to negotiate on the natural resources of Western Sahara with the
Sahrawi directly.
The General Court’s judgment and the Court of Justice’s determination
that Western Sahara was not concerned by the Agreement were based on a
view that sought to interpret international law and the European Union law
coherently. However, it seems less obvious whether the objective of
coherence was met from the viewpoint of the legal repercussions of the case.
By confirming in a judicial process the ability of a legal person, representing
a contested sub-statal entity, to bring an action regarding the bilateral
economic treaty between the EU and Morocco, the Court of Justice in fact
added to the forums that are engaged in the formulation of international law.
This is prone to generate more, not less, incoherence and fragmentation.
Institutionally, the decision also expanded the forums for recognizing Statelike entities away from the politically accountable governments and towards
(quasi-)judicial bodies.
What are the repercussions of the Front Polisario case to the potential
claims of other sub-statal entities that lack sovereignty? We explored this
question within the framework of the Association Agreement between the
European Union and Georgia, focusing on the status of the region of
Abkhazia. More precisely, we assessed whether the status of Abkhazia—
which is de facto governed and represented by authorities separate from
those governing (other parts of) Georgia, yet not recognized by the majority
of the international community including the EU—could be affected by an
economic Treaty between the EU and Georgia.
As for similarities, Georgia, like Morocco, has an Association
Agreement with the EU. However, the EU-Georgia AA is construed in a
manner that strives to be unambiguous regarding the territorial scope of the
treaty already during the time that Georgia does not have effective control
over the Abkhazian territory. The EU-Georgia AA thus avoids well the
pitfalls of the Front Polisario case, even if there may remain marginal space
for contradicting interpretations. In any event, the territorial application of
the Association Agreement will be essential in assessing whether Abkhazia
will in the future be able to raise claims similar to those brought up by Front
Polisario. We identified the rules of origin of the Association Agreement as
possibly a means for making a claim akin to the one on the natural resource
of fish oil in Front Polisario case. Although the merits and outcome of the
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claims on these grounds seem weak, they offer an example of the unintended
reach that economic treaties may have in determining the fragile balance
between territorial integrity and self-determination.
At the same time, our analysis on Abkhazia revealed that any
interpretations of trade and investment agreements from the perspective of
the potentially included sub-statal entities are likely to be highly casedependent. The exact legal status of a party as an applicant in a case, the
direct and individual concern that it may (or may not) have in an agreement,
and the substantive claims it may be able to make regarding the agreement,
are intertwined with the intricacies of the politico-economic situation. The
substantive outcomes of the cases seem particularly varied and diverse. This
clearly limits the effects of any particular arbitration or judicial process on
other treaties and situations.
Considering both the similarities and the idiosyncrasies that our detailed
analysis of the Abkhazian case brought forth, our general conclusion on the
standing of sub-statal entities is that it was in certain relevant respects similar
to that of Front Polisario case. There may hence be essential aspects to these
cases that are of a more general implication. In the case of Front Polisario,
a contested sub-statal entity was, and in the case of Abkhazia might be, in
the absence of intervening external factors, considered a legal person in
accordance with EU law. These types of entities are thus possibly able to
bring actions under Article 263(4) TFEU in a particular case, even in the
absence of a wider acknowledgement of the party’s international legal
personality. The establishment of the party’s ability to bring an action is
often quite sufficient for that party—indeed more important than its success
on the substantive grounds. Standing opens a new, judicial forum for
discussing and promoting the sub-statal entity’s claim for rights, even
sovereignty – claims that may otherwise fail to reach a political forum for
discussion.
Indeed, secession is an interplay of law and politics. The legal notion of
secession is codified in the contradictory rights to territorial integrity and to
self-determination, while the actual weight of these rights remains ultimately
decided in a political process at the international level. Where there are two
or more conflicting non-hierarchical legal forums, it is usually the political
process that determines the order of priority. The priority for existing states
is to conserve the status quo in the face of secessionist tendencies, so they
emphasize the principle of territorial integrity. The case of Western Sahara
illustrates how a long period of stasis may ensue from the inability to verify,
in an international political process, who should be entitled to decide on the
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status of a sub-statal entity. The EU Courts were in the Front Polisario case
drawn into the process of a struggle for self-determination, introducing an
additional judicial forum alongside the (more) political processes. This
altered the balance between the principles of territorial integrity and selfdetermination, and of political and judicial roles, reducing the inherent
structural bias that favors the former. One may ask: does the scope of the
principle of self-determination as interpreted by the CJEU reach so far as to
amount even to a duty on the EU to take position, and hence to get entangled,
in the (internal) affairs of a third country?242
The establishment of sovereignty is also a lengthy process, where a
group can seek recognition for its cause by recourse to multiple legal forums.
Economic treaties and their arbitration bodies offer new, prominent forums
alongside the traditional calls for sovereignty through military means.
Whether it is the economy, human rights, or any other additional legal
discourse, they work to weaken the notions of territorial integrity, while in
parallel the right to self-determination seems to be gaining in importance on
the international level. Sovereignty thus becomes relativised. For the
Sahrawi people, but not for secessionist Abkhazia, the economic law
framework of a bilateral trade agreement tipped the scales towards their
recognition.
Although economic law offers a specific legal forum, its effects may be
widely generalizable. Most global trade takes place under free trade
agreements, and many of those agreements allow cases to be heard before
specific tribunals. Although the decision in Front Polisario directly applies
only within the European Union and Morocco, our analysis of the Abkhazian
case showed the logic of how similar cases could, if not carefully construed
like the EU-Georgia AA, be raised before other tribunals. Indeed, the wide
range of the EU’s Association Agreements, and its trade agreements more
broadly, expands the implications of the case hugely. One need only think of
controversial regions with secessionist tendencies, such as Taiwan, or even
of different parts of the United Kingdom, as it has now left the EU.243
242. For the role of regional international courts in politically sensitive cases, see generally Salvatore
Caserta, Regional International Courts in Search of Relevance–Adjudicating Politically Sensitive
Disputes in Central America and the Caribbean, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 59 (2017) on the role of
regional international courts in politically sensitive cases. The decisions of such courts occasionally
diverge from the preferences of the Member States, but rather than leading to discontent, they might
legitimize the courts’ institutional position as a source of “justice.”
243. See generally Christopher K. Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and
the European Union, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 51 (2013) (describing secession and selfdetermination within the EU).
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The Front Polisario case may increase the role of the courts of the
European Union to act as venues for debating self-determination, secession,
or simply representative democracy. From a more activist, teleological
viewpoint, this could also offer the EU a novel avenue for influencing
developments in the contested regions of the world. The judicial review of
international agreements, unlike purely domestic acts, will impact the sphere
of international relations, which is normally the sensitive competence of the
executive. Taking on such a role thus necessitates careful considerations of
a strategic nature that take into account not only the trading partner, but also
its sub-statal entities and the neighboring states. This is especially true in
situations where it is unclear whether a sub-statal region falls inside or
outside the scope of the EU’s bilateral or multilateral trade agreements with
third countries. Despite these hurdles, trade and economy might serve as
prospective means for change, change that the conference diplomacy of
politically unpopular concessions is unable to reach.

